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REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND
REASSIGNMENT UNDER THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT: ANSWERS,
QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS
AFTER U.S. AIR WA YS, INC. V. BARNETT
Stephen F. Befort*
I. INTRODUCTION
The enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") has
triggered a series of explosions over the past decade.' Although enacted with
widespread support,2 the statute almost immediately spawned a deluge of
litigation. This litigation explosion, coupled with the rather imprecise language of
the statute, resulted in a startling diversity ofjudicial interpretation on a host of key
ADA issues . These two phenomena, in turn, have led to a more recent explosion
* Gray, Plant, Mooty & Bennett Professor of Law, University of Minnesota
Law School. The Author thanks Anne T. Johnson for editorial assistance on this Article.
I. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. The
ADA went into effect with respect to employers with twenty-five or more employees on
July 26, 1992, and with respect to employers with between fifteen and twenty-four
employees on July 26, 1994. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A); EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL ON THE EMPLOYMENT
PROVISIONS (TITLE I) OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT § 10.3 (1992) [hereinafter
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL].
2. The ADA passed both houses of Congress by wide margins. The House of
Representatives passed the ADA with a vote of 403-20. 136 CONG. REC. H 2599-624
(1990). The Senate voted to approve the ADA with a margin of 76-8. 135 CONG. REC. S
10,765-803 (1989).
3. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 (ADA) Charges FY 1992-FY 2002 (Feb. 6, 2003), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ADA-charges.html (reporting that 174,244 charges have been
filed under the ADA from the Act's effective date in 1992 through September 30, 2002).
4. See Stephen F. Befort & Holly Lindquist Thomas, The ADA in Turmoil:
Judicial Dissonance, the Supreme Court's Response, and the Future of Disability
Discrimination Law, 78 OR. L. REV. 27 (1999) (describing ten contentious ADA issues on
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explosion in ADA cases heard by the Supreme Court. In a brief span from 1998 to
2002, the Supreme Court issued no less than thirteen decisions interpreting the
ADA.5 Indeed, employment-based ADA cases accounted for slightly more than
22% of all labor and employment cases decided during the Court's 2001-2002
term .6
A considerable portion of the cases reviewed by the Supreme Court
reflect the fact that the ADA's anti-discrimination formula differs from that of
other federal anti-discrimination statutes. Under Title VII, for example, an
employer is prohibited from discriminating "because of' an individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.7 The ADA's anti-discrimination formula is
more complicated in two significant respects. First, only individuals who have a
qualifying "disability" have standing to assert a claim under the ADA.' Second, in
ascertaining whether an employer is discriminating in violation of the ADA, the
statute asks whether the employee is qualified for the job "with or without
reasonable accommodation." 9
Discrimination Law, 78 OR. L. REv. 27 (1999) (describing ten contentious ADA issues on
which the circuit courts and/or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission took
conflicting positions and also discussing the reasons for this widespread judicial
dissonance).
5. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002); Chevron USA, Inc. v. Echazabal,
536 U.S. 72 (2002); U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002); EEOC v. Waffle
House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002); Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184
(2002); PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001); Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
356 (2001); Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel
Serv., 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999);
Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S.
624 (1998); Pa. Dep't ofCorrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998).
6. See Cynthia Estlund, The Supreme Court's Labor and Employment Cases of
the 2001-2002 Term, 18 LAB. LAW. 291 (2002).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2003). The ADEA uses similar language in banning
discrimination because of age. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2003) ("It shall be unlawful for
an employer ... [to] discriminate against any individual . . .because of such individual's
age.").
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2003). In contrast, Title VII does not impose any
class membership standing requirement. Anyone can assert a claim of discrimination under
the statute. See Befort & Thomas, supra note 4, at 69.
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Neither Title VII nor the ADEA generally impose
any affirmative obligation on employers to assist employees in satisfactorily performing the
essential functions of the job. Instead, these statutes merely invoke a negative prohibition
against discrimination. See Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil
Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMp. & LAB. L. 19, 40-44 (2000) (contrasting how the ADA
employs a different treatment model of discrimination while most anti-discrimination
statutes employ an equal treatment model of discrimination). While Title VII does impose a
duty on employers to accommodate the religious observances and practices of its
employees (see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2003)), the Supreme Court has construed this duty as
far more limited than that imposed by the ADA. See infra note 18.
932 [Vol. 45:931
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Much of the litigation that has arisen under the ADA concerns these two
unique ADA provisions. During the ADA's first decade, disputes concerning the
breadth of the "disability" definition garnered the bulk of judicial attention. Six of
the Supreme Court's thirteen ADA decisions, for example, have dealt with this
issue.'" As the Supreme Court has clarified, and narrowed," who is disabled for
purposes of the ADA, the focus of attention now is shifting to the reasonable
accommodation provision.
The Supreme Court issued its first decision in a Title I reasonable
accommodation case in 2002 in US. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett. 2 In that case, the
Court was confronted with the issue of whether an employer, in order to comply
with the ADA's reasonable accommodation duty, must reassign a disabled
employee to a vacant position in spite of the fact that the employer's longstanding
seniority system would award the position to a more senior, non-disabled
employee. 3 In many respects, it is fitting that the Supreme Court's initial take on
the reasonable accommodation issue involved a question of reassignment, since
the reassignment accommodation has proven to be one of the most difficult and
controversial of all accommodation issues. " Indeed, a number of lower courts
have declined to require employers to reassign disabled workers on the grounds
that doing so would amount to preferential treatment akin to affirmative action.5
Since the Barnett case represents the Supreme Court's initial
construction of the ADA's reasonable accommodation and reassignment concepts,
the Court's decision had the potential to offer considerable guidance as to the
10. See generally Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. 184; Albertsons, Inc., 527 U.S.
555; Murphy, 527 U.S. 516; Sutton, 527 U.S. 471; Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795;
Bragdon, 524 U.S. 624.
I. A number of commentators have argued that the judicial construction of the
"disability" standing requirement has unduly restricted access to the protections of the
ADA. See, e.g., Diller supra note 9; Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A
Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 109 (1999) (finding, based on
empirical analysis of decided court decisions, that defendants prevail in 92.7% of all ADA
cases).
12. 535 U.S. 391 (2002). Title I of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-17, governs
disability discrimination in employment. Other ADA titles apply to state and local
government entities (Title 11, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-89) and to public accommodations
provided by private entities (Title III, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-50). The Supreme Court
previously had decided one case involving an issue of reasonable accommodation under
Title III. See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001) (holding that certain
professional golf tournaments must permit a disabled golf professional to ride a cart so as to
enable him to participate in the tournaments, and that such a reasonable modification would
not fundamentally alter the nature of those events).
13. See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 393.
14. See infra notes 20-24 and accompanying text; see also Stephen F. Befort,
The Most Difficult ADA Reasonable Accommodation Issues: Reassignment and Leave of
Absence, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 439, 447-49 (2002) (discussing how reassignment and
leave of absence pose the most difficulties of any type of reasonable accommodation).
15. See infra notes 108-12, 123-28 and accompanying text.
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proper scope of these concepts, in particular, as well as to the future development
of ADA jurisprudence, in general. The Barnett decision fulfills some of these
expectations. The Barnett majority ruled that reassignment by way of an exception
to a seniority system is not reasonable in the run of cases, at least in the absence of
a showing of special circumstances. 6 The decision also provides many clues
concerning the ADA's possible future direction. The five opinions issued in
Barnett, however, raise or avoid as many questions as they provide answers. These
opinions, moreover, reveal a Court with widely divergent views of the ADA's
mechanics and objectives.
This Article attempts a critical analysis of the various answers and
questions emanating from the Barnett decision. The Article also offers some
solutions for Barnett's unanswered questions. Many of these questions go to the
heart of just what the ADA is intended to accomplish: questions such as the
appropriateness of preferential treatment for the disabled, the burden of proof
allocation for establishing the existence of a reasonable accommodation, and
whether the reassignment accommodation will also defer to other types of facially
neutral employer transfer and assignment policies that negatively impact
employment opportunities for the disabled.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the ADA's reasonable
accommodation requirement, including a discussion of two procedural issues
concerning the scope of the accommodation duty that have divided the circuit
courts. Part III looks more narrowly at the reassignment accommodation and three
contentious reassignment issues on which the circuit courts and/or the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") similarly are divided. Following
that background, Part IV discusses the Barnett decision, including each of the five
separate opinions. Part V then analyzes both the answers provided by the Court in
Barnett and the various questions that remain unanswered in its wake. Finally, this
Part goes on to suggest some policy-based solutions for these remaining questions
as well as for the future direction of American disability discrimination law.
II. THE REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION REQUIREMENT
A. The Role of Reasonable Accommodation Under the ADA
The ADA prohibits discrimination against a qualified individual with a
disability. 7 The ADA's discrimination prohibition differs from that of other
employment discrimination statutes, however, in that it requires an employer to
gauge an employee's qualifications only after providing a reasonable
16. See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 404-05.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). An individual has a "disability" for purposes of the
ADA if he or she has "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
of the maior life activities of such individual." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
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accommodation designed to assist employee performance." The ADA defines a
"qualified individual with a disability" as "an individual with a disability, who,
with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of
the employment position that such individual holds or desires."' 9 This definition
requires employers to engage in a two-step inquiry: (1) identify the essential
functions of the job in question; and (2) determine whether the individual can
perform those essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation,"
The EEOC, the administrative agency charged with promulgating
regulations to implement the statutory language of the ADA, 2' defines essential
functions as the "fundamental job duties" of the employment position, but not
those functions that are merely "marginal" in nature.22 The regulations state that a
job function may be considered essential because the position exists to perform
that function, only a limited number of employees are available to perform the job
function, and/or the function involves a high degree of specialization.23
Once the essential functions of the position are identified, the employer
next must ask whether the disabled individual can perform these essential
functions without reasonable accommodation. If the answer is in the affirmative,
then the individual is "qualified" under the statute. If the answer is in the negative,
then the employer has an affirmative obligation to provide the individual with a
reasonable accommodation unless doing so would cause the employer to suffer an
undue hardship.24
18. The reasonable accommodation requirement is unique to disability law. In
addition to the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which bans disability discrimination
by federal employers, contractors and grant recipients, included a similar reasonable
accommodation requirement. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-96 (2003). With the exception of persons
claiming discrimination on the basis of religion, neither Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)
(2003), nor the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34
(2003), entitles persons protected by either statute to demand accommodations in their
favor. The Supreme Court has construed the reasonable accommodation requirement for
religion very narrowly, holding that an employer need not incur more than a de minimis
hardship in providing an accommodation for religious purposes. See TWA, Inc. v.
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2003).
20. See Befort & Thomas, supra note 4, at 35.
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (2003) (stating that "the Commission shall issue
regulations in an accessible format to carry out this subchapter").
22. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (2003).
23. See id. § 1630.2(n)(2). The ADA states that "if an employer has prepared a
written description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description
shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
24. See Borkowski v.Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1995)
(stating that "the plaintiff bears the burden of proving either that she can meet the
requirements of the job without assistance, or that an accommodation exists that permits her
to perform the job's essential functions").
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The ADA excuses an employer from accommodating an individual with a
disability if the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on that
employer." The statute defines undue hardship as "an action requiring significant
difficulty or expense,"26 and provides a list of factors to consider in determining
whether the proposed accommodation would cause a particular employer to suffer
an undue hardship. 7 Unless an employer proves undue hardship, its failure to
provide an accommodation that is both available and reasonable results in a
violation of the statute.28
B. Types of Reasonable Accommodation
Reasonable accommodation is defined generally as "any change in the
work environment or in the way things are customarily done that enables anindividual with a disability to enjoy employment opportunities." '29 The ADA states
that a reasonable accommodation may include:
25. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2003) (stating that an employer does not
violate the ADA for failing to provide a reasonable accommodation if the employer can
"demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of
the business of such covered entity").
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(10)(A).
27. Section 12111 (10)(B) provides that in determining whether an
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on a covered entity, factors to be
considered include:
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this Act;
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in
the provision of the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons
employed at such facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or the
impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the operation of the
facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size
of the business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its
employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including
the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of such
entity; the geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship
of the facility or facilities in question to the covered entity.
See also Befort & Thomas, supra note 4, at 37 (describing the undue hardship defense as a
"floating concept that varies with the nature and cost of the proposed accommodation, the
impact of the proposed accommodation upon the operation of the facility, and the overall
resources of both the facility in question and the employer in general").
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (defining discrimination under the ADA to
include "not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or
employee"). The federal courts of appeal are split as to the requisite burdens of proof in
establishing a reasonable accommodation.
29. 29 C.F.R. PART 1630 APPENDIX § 1630.2(o) (2003) [hereinafter Interpretive
Guidance].
2003] REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION 937
The EEOC's Interpretive Guidance states that "[t]his listing is not intended to be
exhaustive of accommodation possibilities.
The range of contemplated ADA reasonable accommodations may be
grouped into five functional categories. They are:
(1) Making changes to existing facilities. An employer's duty to modify
its facilities includes making both work and non-work areas used by employees
accessible to a disabled employee.32 Modifications to restrooms, break rooms, and
lunchrooms thus may be required as reasonable accommodations. 3
(2) Providing assistive devices or personnel. The statute lists the
"acquisition or modification of equipment or devices" and "the provision of
qualified readers or interpreters" as reasonable accommodations. 4 The Interpretive
Guidance further suggests that an employer may be required to permit a disabled
employee to utilize his or her own equipment or aids, such as a guide dog for an
individual who is blind, even though the employer itself may not be required to
provide such an accommodation.
35
(3) Job restructuring. This type of accommodation entails making
changes to an employee's current job.36 While an employer is not required to
reallocate essential job functions,3' an employer may need to reallocate or
redistribute nonessential, marginal job functions that a qualified individual with a
disability is unable to perform.3 8 An employer also may be required to change
31. Interpretive Guidance, supra note 29, § 1630.2(o).
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B).
35. See Interpretive Guidance, supra note 29, § 1630.2(o).
36. See Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1314-15 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en
banc) (Silberman, J., dissenting) (explaining how job restructuring involves making
accommodations to a disabled employee in his current position).
37. See Interpretive Guidance, supra note 29, § 1630.2(o) ("An employer or
other covered entity is not required to reallocate essential functions.").
38. See id. The EEOC's Interpretive Guidance demonstrates this type of
accommodation by way of the following illustration:
An employer may have two jobs, each of which entails the performance
of a number of marginal functions. The employer hires a qualified
individual with a disability who is able to perform some of the marginal
functions of each job but not all of the marginal functions of either job.
As an accommodation, the employer may redistribute the marginal
functions so that all of the marginal functions that the qualified
individual with a disability can perform are made a part of the position to
be filled by the qualified individual with a disability. The remaining
marginal functions that the individual with a disability cannot perform
would then be transferred to the other position.
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when and how a job function is performed, such as by authorizing modified or
part-time work schedules. 9
(4) Reassignment to a vacant position. The reassignment accommodation
involves placing the disabled employee in a new position. This type of
accommodation goes a step beyond those listed above in that, instead of making
adjustments to enable an employee to perform his or her current job, it transfers
the disabled employee to an entirely different job.
(5) Leave of absence. Although not listed in the statute, both the EEOC40
and the courts4 recognize that a leave of absence may serve as an additional type
of reasonable accommodation. A leave of absence may enable a disabled
employee, through rest and/or rehabilitation, to return to productive work.42
C. The Interactive Process
The EEOC regulations state that once an individual with a disability
requests an accommodation, the employer should consult with that employee in
ascertaining an appropriate reasonable accommodation. The regulations envision
that the employer will initiate an "informal, interactive process" with a qualified
applicant or employee to "identify the precise limitations resulting from the
disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those
limitations."43
The EEOC's Interpretive Guidance provides more detail as to the
suggested structure of this process. The Guidance states that it should be a
"flexible" process that involves "the individual assessment of both the particular
individual with a disability who is able to perform some of the marginal
functions of each job but not all of the marginal functions of either job.
As an accommodation, the employer may redistribute the marginal
functions so that all of the marginal functions that the qualified
individual with a disability can perform are made a part of the position
to be filled by the qualified individual with a disability. The remaining
marginal functions that the individual with a disability cannot perform
would then be transferred to the other position.
Id.
39. See id. ("For example, an essential function customarily performed in the
early morning hours may be rescheduled until later in the day as a reasonable
accommodation to a disability that precludes performance of the function at the customary
hour.").
40. See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE:
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/accommodation.html (last
modified Oct. 2002) [hereinafter ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE].
41. See, e.g., Cehrs v. Northeast Ohio Alzheimer's Research Cent., 155 F.3d 775
(6th Cir. 1998); Criado v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 437 (1st Cir. 1998).
42. See generally Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 1995).
43. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (1999).
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job at issue, and the specific physical or mental limitations of the particular
individual in need of reasonable accommodation."" The Guidance goes on to
recommend that the parties jointly engage in a four-step "problem solving
approach":
(1) Analyze the particular job involved and determine its purpose
and essential functions;
(2) Consult with the individual with a disability to ascertain the
precise job-related limitations imposed by the individual's disability
and how those limitations could be overcome with a reasonable
accommodation;
(3) In consultation with the individual to be accommodated, identify
potential accommodations and assess the effectiveness each would
have in enabling the individual to perform the essential functions of
the position; and
(4) Consider the preference of the individual to be accommodated
and select and implement the accommodation that is most
appropriate for both the employee and the employer.45
D. Two Contentious Reasonable Accommodation Issues
At the time the Supreme Court decided Barnett, the circuit courts of
appeal were divided on two issues relating to the general scope of the reasonable
accommodation prong of the ADA's anti-discrimination formula. Both issues
relate to the procedural burdens borne the parties when attempting to ascertain the
existence of a viable reasonable accommodation.
1. What is the appropriate burden ofproof allocation in determining the
existence of a reasonable accommodation?
The federal courts of appeal are split as to the requisite burdens of proof
in establishing the appropriateness of a reasonable accommodation. Some early
Rehabilitation Act cases placed the burden entirely on the employer to
demonstrate that a reasonable accommodation was not possible.46 Courts
interpreting the ADA have not followed this approach, but instead generally have
adopted one of two competing formulations. Several circuits have read the
statutory language as dividing the reasonable accommodation and undue hardship
proof burdens equally among the parties so that the disabled employee bears the
burden of proof to show a reasonable accommodation while the employer bears a
44. Interpretive Guidance, supra note 29, § 1630.9.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985); Jasany v.
United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1985).
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similar burden to establish the existence of an undue hardship.47 Under this
approach, the employee bears the burden of persuasion to show both the existence
and reasonableness of a proposed accommodation that would enable the employee
to perform the essential functions of the job in question.4" If an employee can
make this showing, then the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the
proposed accommodation would pose an undue hardship.49
Other circuit decisions place only a burden of production on the disabled
employee.50 Under this approach, an employee's burden is satisfied if the
employee "suggest[s] the existence of a plausible accommodation, the costs of
which, facially, do not exceed its benefits."'" The employer, however, bears the
ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of reasonableness, which "merges, in
effect, with its burden of showing, as an affirmative defense, that the proposed
accommodation would cause it to suffer an undue hardship."52
The EEOC, in litigation, has urged yet another variation. The EEOC has
argued that the only burden that an employee should bear is to show that the
suggested accommodation would effectively enable the employee to perform the
essential functions of the job. 3 According to the EEOC, other issues potentially
bearing on reasonableness, such as cost or difficulty, should be a matter of proof
for the employer.5 4 No circuit court, however, has adopted the EEOC's position.55
2. What is the employer's obligation to participate in the inter-active
process?
While the ADA is silent as to the process by which the parties should
identify the existence of a reasonable accommodation, the regulations interpreting
the ADA state that "it may necessary for the employer to initiate an informal,
interactive process with the [disabled] individual."56 Based upon this language, a
number of circuit courts have ruled that an employer has an affirmative obligation
to engage in an interactive process once it has been put on notice that an
47. See, e.g., Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 196 F.3d 979, 988-89 (9th Cir. 1999);
Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 285-86 (11 th Cir. 1997); Monette v. Elec. Data Sys.
Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1183, 1186 (6th Cir. 1996); Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1186 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (interpreting the Rehabilitation Act).
48. See Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 157 F.3d 744, 749 (9th Cir. 1998); Willis, 108
F.3d at 285-86.
49. See Barnett, 157 F.3d at 749; Willis, 108 F.3d at 285-86.
50. See, e.g., Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254, 258-59 (1st Cir.
2001); Walton v. Mental Health Ass'n., 168 F.3d 661, 670 (3d Cir. 1999); Stone v. City of
Mount Vernon, 118 F.3d 92, 98 (2d Cir. 1997).
51. Reed, 244 F.3d at 258.
52. Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1995).
53. See Reed, 244 F.3d at 259.
54. Id.
55. Id. at n.4.
56. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (1999).
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accommodation may be necessary." Other circuit courts, however, have found that
participation in the interactive process is not mandatory. 58 These courts point out
that the statute only mandates the provision of a reasonable accommodation if
such exists, but not participation in a procedural step that may or may not bear
fruit.59
The courts also are divided with respect to the appropriate consequences
for failing to engage in the interactive process. While at least one circuit court
decision has suggested that independent liability may exist under the ADA for a
party who fails to participate in the interactive process,6" most courts hold that
liability will arise only where an employer has failed as a matter of substance to
implement a reasonable accommodation that would enable a disabled employee to
perform adequately in the workplace.6' Taking a somewhat different tack, an
apparently growing number of circuit courts have ruled that an employer's failure
to engage in the interactive process ordinarily should warrant a trial court's refusal
to grant an employer's motion for summary judgment.62 Some courts reach this
conclusion on the grounds that a failure to participate in the interactive process
constitutes evidence of bad faith,63 while others conclude that an employer's
failure to consult shifts the "burden of production concerning the availability of a
reasonable accommodation from the employee to the employer."64
III. THE REASSIGNMENT ACCOMMODATION
A. EEOC Guitlelines on Reassignment
The EEOC has issued several interpretive aids that provide guidance
concerning the scope of the reassignment accommodation. These include formal
regulations,65 the Interpretive Guidance of Title I,66 Technical Assistance
57. See, e.g., Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc);
Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 188 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 1999); Taylor v. Phoenixville
Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 1999).
58. See, e.g., Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 285 (1 1th Cir. 1997); White
v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 363 (10th Cir. 1995).
59. Willis, 108 F.3d at 285; White, 45 F.3d at 363.
60. See Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 130, 1135-36 (7th Cir.
1996).
61. See, e.g., Kvoriak v. Maine, 259 F.3d 48, 54 n.I 1 (1st Cir. 2001); Barnett v.
U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1113-14 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Rehling v. City of
Chicago, 207 F.3d 1009, 1016 (7th Cir. 2000).
62. See, e.g., Morton v. United Parcel Serv., 272 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 2001);
jellestad, 188 F.3d at 952; Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 318 (3d Cir.
1999).
63. See Fjellestad, 188 F.3d at 952; Taylor, 184 F.3d at 318.
64. Mays v. Principi, 301 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2002).
65. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.1-1630.16(1999).
66. Interpretive Guidance, supra note 29, §§ 1630.1-16.
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Manual,67 and Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation and Undue
Hardship.6" Taken together, these guidelines establish a number of basic principles
that courts generally have accepted as establishing the parameters of the
reassignment accommodation.69
First, reassignment is required only for current employees, not
applicants.7" Although the language of the statute makes no distinction between
employees and applicants in this regard, the EEOC follows the legislative history'
in concluding that "[r]eassignment is not available to applicants."72
Second, "[r]eassignment is the reasonable accommodation of last
resort." 3 The Enforcement Guidance, for example, provides that reassignment "is
required only after it has been determined that: (1) there are no effective
accommodations that will enable the employee to perform the essential functions
of his/her current position, or (2) all other reasonable accommodation would
impose an undue hardship."74
Third, an employer is under no obligation to reassign a disabled
employee except to a position that is truly vacant.75 The Enforcement Guidance
defines a vacancy as a position that is either available when the employee requests
a reasonable accommodation or one that the employer is aware will become
available within a reasonable time.76 The regulations further explain that a position
is considered vacant "even if an employer has posted a notice or announcement
seeking applications for that position."77 An employer is not required to "bump"
another employee in order to create a vacancy,78 nor is an employer required either
67. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 1.
68. ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 40.
69. See John E. Murray & Christopher J. Murray, Enabling the Disabled
Reassignment and the ADA, 83 MARQ. L. REV. 721, 731-32 (2000) (noting a consensus
among federal courts concerning certain steps that employers are not obligated to take in
order to comply with the reassignment requirement).
70. See Interpretive Guidance, supra note 29, § 1630.2(o).
71. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 56 (1990) (referring to reassignment for
employees, but not applicants).
72. Interpretive Guidance, supra note 29, § 1630.2(o).
73. ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 40; see also Interpretive Guidance,
supra note 29, § 1630.2(o).
74. ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 40; see also Interpretive Guidance,
supra note 29, § 1630.2(o) (stating that "[i]n general, reassignment should be considered
only when accommodation within the individual's current position would pose an undue
hardship").
75. ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 40 (defining "vacant").
76. Id.; see also Interpretive Guidance, supra note 29, § 1630.2(o) (stating that
what constitutes "[a] 'reasonable amount of time' should be determined in light of the
totality of the circumstances").
77. See ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 40.
78. Id.
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to create a new position for a disabled employee or to promote a disabled
employee to a higher graded position."9
Fourth, even if the "vacancy" of a position is established, an employer
need not reassign a disabled individual unless he or she is "qualified" for the new
position.8" Otherwise stated, the disabled employee must demonstrate that he or
she satisfies the requisite job requirements and is capable of performing the
position's essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation.8
Fifth, as with all the accommodations listed in the ADA, an employer is
excused from the obligation of reassigning a disabled employee if doing so would
result in an undue hardship.82
Finally, according to the EEOC's Enforcement Guidance, a disabled
"employee gets the vacant position if s/he is qualified for it."83 The EEOC position
is that an employer does not satisfy the reassignment duty merely by permitting a
disabled employee to compete with others for a vacant position.84 The
Enforcement Guidance, structured in a question and answer format, provides the
following exchange:
Q: Does reassignment mean that the employee is permitted to
compete for a vacant position?
A: No. Reassignment means that the employee gets the vacant
position if s/he is qualified for it. Otherwise, reassignment would be
of little value and would not be implemented as Congress
intended.85
The Enforcement Guidance also addresses the issue of employer policies:
79. Id. An employer, however, may have a duty to reassign a disabled employee
to a lower graded position as a reasonable accommodation. See Interpretive Guidance,
supra note 29, § 1630.2(o) ("An employer may reassign an individual to a lower graded
position if there are no accommodations that would enable the employee to remain in the
current position and there are no vacant equivalent positions for which the individual is
qualified with or without a reasonable accommodation.").
80. See ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 40.
81. See id; see also Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Auto., Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 678 (7th
Cir. 1998) (stating that in determining those positions for which a disabled employee may
be qualified, "[t]he employer must first identify the full range of alternate positions for
which the individual satisfies the employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory prerequisites,
and then determine whether the employee's own knowledge, skills, and abilities would
enable her to perform the essential functions of those alternate positions, with or without
reasonable accommodations").
82. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text (discussing the undue
hardship defense).





Q: Must an employer offer reassignment as a reasonable
accommodation if it does not allow any of its employees to transfer
from one position to another?
A: Yes. The ADA requires employers to provide reasonable
accommodations to individuals with disabilities, including
reassignment, even though they are not available to others.
Therefore, an employer who does not normally transfer employees
would still have to reassign an employee with a disability, unless it
could show that the reassignment caused undue hardship. And, if an
employer has a policy prohibiting transfers, it would have to modify
that policy in order to reassign an employee with a disability, unless
it could show undue hardship."
B. The Most Controversial Accommodation
Of all the accommodations listed in the ADA, the reassignment
accommodation has proven to be the most difficult to apply. In particular, the
reassignment accommodation has generated the most litigation, including that
involving three contentious issues on which the federal courts are split. 7
Several reasons may account for the additional scrutiny demanded of the
reassignment accommodation. First, the reassignment obligation is a duty that was
not recognized prior to the adoption of the ADA. Although the ADA closely tracks
the statutory language of the Rehabilitation Act of 197388 and its interpretive case
law,89 the ADA departs from its older statutory sibling by expressly including
"reassignment to a vacant position" in its list of reasonable accommodations." The
Rehabilitation Act required reassignment only if it was available under an
employer's existing policies. 9 Reassignment, therefore, was a permissible, but not
86. Id.
87. These three issues are discussed infra notes 99-128 and accompanying text.
88. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-96 (2003).
89. See GARY PHELAN & JANET BOND ATHERTON, DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION IN
THE WORKPLACE § 1.06 (1997) (indicating that the ADA was closely modeled on the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
90. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2003) (listing "reassignment to a vacant
position" as a reasonable accommodation).
91. See Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1987)
(summarizing reassignment duty under the Rehabilitation Act). In Arline, the Supreme
Court stated:
Employers have an affirmative obligation to make a reasonable
accommodation for a handicapped employee. Although they are not
required to find another job for an employee who is not qualified for the
job he or she was doing, they cannot deny an employee alternative
employment opportunities reasonably available under the employer's
existing policies.
Id.; see also Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 467 (4th Cir. 1987); 29 C.F.R. § 1614.704
(1991).
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a required, accommodation. 92 The lack of clearly delineated standards for
reassigning qualified individuals with disabilities under the Rehabilitation Act may
explain some of the current struggle that the federal courts are experiencing in
defining the scope of this new ADA accommodation.93
Second, accommodation by way of reassignment requires a greater
degree of workplace reorganization and imposes extra burdens on both employers
and fellow workers as compared to other types of accommodations. The other
types of accommodations recognized under the ADA94 involve relatively minor
adjustments that enable a disabled employee to remain in his or her current
position. Changes made to existing facilities and the provision of assistive devices,
for example, may impact the manner in which work is performed, but generally do
not alter the quantity and quality of such work. These accommodations impose
some obligations on the employer but have no immediate impact on non-disabled
co-employees.95 Similarly, job restructuring involves making adjustments for
disabled employees in their current position that, again, would have little impact
upon the rights of other employees.96 Although an employer's reallocation of
marginal functions may alter some of the tasks performed by other employees in
the workplace, such an accommodation does not necessarily result in a net
increase of work duties for the non-disabled employee.97 Thus, with respect to
each of these accommodations, the disabled employee continues to perform the
essential duties of his or her assigned job. The employer reaps the benefit of the
work that is performed, and fellow employees are not burdened with the
reallocation of any essential duties.
92. See Jeffrey S. Berenholz, Note, The Development of Reassignment to a
Vacant Position in the Americans with Disabilities Act, 15 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 635,
639 (1998).
93. Nevertheless, Congress clearly intended to go beyond the Rehabilitation Act
by expressly providing in the text of the ADA that reasonable accommodation may include
"reassignment to a vacant position." See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9). Congress' commitment to
reassignment as an accommodation for the disabled was further evidenced when Congress
amended the Rehabilitation Act in 1992 to expressly include reassignment as an
accommodation. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 791(g), 794(d) (1994), amended by Rehabilitation Act
Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-569, 106 Stat. 4344 (1992).
94. See supra notes 29-42 and accompanying text (discussing the types of
reasonable accommodations under the ADA).
95. See Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en
banc) (Silberman, J., dissenting).
96. See id. at 1315 (observing that job restructuring and part time and modified
work schedules involve accommodations of an employee's current position and "have no
direct effect on non-disabled employees or applicants").
97. The reallocation is a trade-off of marginal job functions between the disabled
and non-disabled employee: the non-disabled employee picks up those marginal functions
that the disabled employee cannot perform and the disabled employee picks up those
functions that he or she can perform from the non-disabled employee. See supra note 38
and accompanying text.
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In contrast, a reassignment removes the disabled employee from his or
her current position and places the employee in a new position that invariably
entails different duties than that which the employee performed in the previous
position. For an employer, such a transfer means that it will not receive the work
effort of employees who are trained and experienced in their current positions. The
employer will need to identify and train a new worker to perform these tasks.
Reassignment additionally limits an employer's discretion in filling vacant
positions. A mandatory reassignment duty, in short, impinges on management's
overall flexibility and productivity.
The reassignment accommodation also imposes burdens on fellow
employees. A reassignment mandated by the ADA may translate into a tangible
loss for other employees because the placement of a disabled employee into a
vacant position necessarily deprives other employees of the possibility of filling
that position. 8 Reassignment also may necessitate the transfer of a co-worker who
must learn how to perform the functions of the transferred employee.
C. Three Contentious Reassignment Issues
Courts have experienced considerable difficulty in determining the reach
of the reassignment accommodation. This difficulty is illustrated by the fact that
the circuit courts of appeal have reached different conclusions with respect to three
reassignment issues. Each of these three issues is summarized below.
1. Is reassignment of a disabled employee required by the ADA when
such result would violate the seniority rights of another employee
under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement?
The EEOC, in both its Interpretive Guidance and the Technical
Assistance Manual, suggests that the terms of a collective bargaining agreement
("CBA") may be relevant in determining whether an accommodation would
impose an "undue hardship."99 This position finds support in the ADA's legislative
history which indicates that collective bargaining provisions are relevant but not
determinative on the reassignment issue.' °°
At least two court decisions have looked favorably on the EEOC's
position. In Emrick v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co.,' °' the federal district court for the
eastern district of Texas ruled that a collective bargaining agreement should be a
factor to consider when determining the reasonableness of an accommodation, but
that a per se rule should not apply to ADA cases. Similarly, in Aka v. Washington
98. See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1315 (Silberman, J., dissenting) (noting that in contrast
to other types of accommodations listed in the ADA, reassignment infringes on the rights of
non-disabled employees).
99. See TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 1, §§ 3.9, 7.11.
100. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63 (1990).
101. 875 F.Supp. 393, 396-97 (E.D. Tex. 1995).
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Hospital Center,"°2 a panel of the D.C. Circuit adopted a balancing standard that
would weigh the need for an accommodation with the degree of hardship imposed
by the infringement on seniority rights. The court noted that this balance should be
based on the particular circumstances of each case, with a potential "continuum"
of results.'0 3 The Aka decision subsequently was vacated and decided en banc on
different grounds." 4
In Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., however, the Seventh Circuit
adopted a per se rule that an employer is not required to violate a seniority system
agreed upon in a CBA in order to reassign a disabled employee as a reasonable
accommodation." 5 The majority of circuit courts have now adopted this
position."0 6 These cases find that a per se rule provides a predictable, bright-line
standard and recognizes the special status of collectively bargained seniority
rights. 07
2. Does the ADA require an employer to transfer a disabled employee to
a vacant position despite the superior qualifications of another
applicant or employee who also desires that position?
In EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., °8 the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals expressly rejected the EEOC's interpretation that a disabled employee
should be afforded a priority in filling vacant positions.' 9 The Seventh Circuit, in
a decision authored by Judge Posner, criticized the EEOC's position as giving
"bonus points" to individuals with disabilities even where an employee's disability
puts her at no disadvantage in bidding for an open position." ° Such a result,
according to Judge Posner, would constitute "affirmative action with a
vengeance."'.. The court, instead, concluded that "the ADA does not require an
employer to reassign a disabled employee to a job for which there is a better
102. 116 F.3d 876, 896 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
103. Id.
104. Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
The en banc decision is discussed infra at notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
105. 94 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir. 1996).
106. See Willis v. Pac. Mar. Assoc., 244 F.3d 675, 681-82 (9th Cir. 2001);
Feliciano v. Rhode Island, 160 F.3d 780, 787 (Ist Cir. 1998); Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76
(3d Cir. 1997); Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800 (5th Cir. 1997); Benson
v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108 (8th Cir. 1995); Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d
1118 (10th Cir. 1995).
107. See Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1052.
108. 227 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 2000).
109. The EEOC's interpretation is discussed supra at notes 83-86 and
accompanying text.
110. Humiston-Keeling, 227 F.3d at 1027.
11. Id. at 1029.
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applicant, provided it's the employer's consistent and honest policy to hire the best
applicant ... in question."" 2
The District of Columbia and Tenth Circuit courts of appeal disagree. In
Aka v. Washington Hospital Center,"3 the D.C. Circuit expressed the view that
reassignment under the ADA requires something more of an employer than simply
allowing a disabled employee to compete equally with other applicants for a
vacant position. The court looked at the ADA's statutory text and concluded that
the natural meaning of the word "reassign" necessarily implies the need for some
"active effort" on the part of the employer.""' 4 The court, however, did not specify
what type of active effort was necessary for an employer to comply with the
ADA's reassignment duty.
The Tenth Circuit, in Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc.," ' went beyond Aka to
define more precisely what "something more" entails by stating that "[t]he
disabled employee has a right in fact to the reassignment, and not just to the
consideration process leading up to the potential reassignment."' 6 To eliminate
any doubt as to the majority's interpretation of the statute, the opinion summarized
an employer's reassignment obligation as follows:
The unvarnished obligation derived from the statute is this: an
employer discriminates against a qualified individual with a
disability if the employer fails to offer a reasonable accommodation.
If no reasonable accommodation can keep the employee in his or
her existing job, then the reasonable accommodation may require
reassignment to a vacant position so long as the employee is
qualified for the job and it does not impose an undue burden on the
employer. Anything more, such as requiring the reassigned
employee to be the best qualified employee for the vacant job, is
judicial gloss unwarranted by the statutory language or its
legislative history. "'
3. Does the ADA's reassignment accommodation compel employers to
make exceptions to non-discriminatory transfer and assignment
policies?
Similar issues arise when the reassignment of a disabled employee would
conflict with a facially non-discriminatory employer policy. The type of policy at
issue here generally concerns an employer's protocol for filling vacant positions.
Some decisions have adhered to the EEOC's interpretation and ruled that
such policies must give way to the obligation to reassign qualified disabled
112. Id.
113. 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
114. Id. at 1304.
115. 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
116. Id. at 1166.
117. Id. at 1169.
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employees. In Davoll v. Webb," 8 several police officers employed by the City of
Denver were forced into retirement after disabling conditions rendered them
unable to perform their current jobs, and a city-wide policy against employee
transfers precluded their placement into other vacant positions. The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals, relying heavily on its holding in Smith, ruled that a "disabled
employee has a right in fact to the reassignment, and not just to the consideration
process leading up to the potential reassignment."'' 9 Similarly, the district court in
Ransom v. Arizona Board of Regents,20 struck down a policy requiring that "all
employees, including those with disabilities, must compete for job reassignments
through the competitive hiring process."'' The court ruled that the defendant's
competitive transfer policy effectively "prevents" the reassignment of disabled
employees and, therefore, "discriminates against 'qualified individuals with
disabilities.''
22
Several other decisions, however, maintain that such an interpretation
amounts to an impermissible "preference" for disabled workers. In Daugherty v.
City of El Paso, 23 for example, a part-time city bus driver was denied
reassignment to a different full-time position because of a policy that gave full-
time employees priority over part-time workers. The court concluded that the city
was not required to make an exception, stating that "we do not read the ADA as
requiring affirmative action in favor of individuals with disabilities, in the sense of
requiring that disabled persons be given priority in hiring or reassignment over
those who are not disabled."'2 4 In Dalton v. Subaru-lsuzu Automotive, Inc., 2 1 the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiffs' request that they receive
permanent positions within the employer's established temporary job placement
program for employees with temporary disabilities. The court, after reviewing the
statute and existing case law, concluded that the ADA does not compel an
employer "to abandon its legitimate nondiscriminatory company policies defining
job qualifications, prerequisites, and entitlements to intra-company transfers."' 26
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Duckett v. Dunlop Tire
Corp.27 has held that the ADA does not require an employer to violate its "no roll
back" policy that prohibited employees from transferring from salaried positions
to production positions within the bargaining unit.2'
118. 194 F.3d 1116 (1uth Cir. 1999).
119. Id. at 1132.
120. 983 F. Supp. 895 (D. Ariz. 1997).
121. Id. at 898.
122. Id. at 903.
123. 56 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 1995).
124. Id. at 700.
125. 141 F. 3d 667 (7th Cir. 1998).
126. Id. at 678.
127. 120 F.3d 1222 (11th Cir. 1997).
128. Id. at 1225. See also EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349, 355-56 (4th
Cir. 2001) (ruling that an employer need not disregard its seniority policy in order to
reassign a disabled employee); Burns v. Coca-Cola Enter., 222 F.3d 247, 258 (2000)
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IV. U.S. AIRWAYS, INC. v. BARNETT
A. Introduction
U.S. Airways, Inc. ("U.S. Air") has a long-standing seniority policy in
place for filling certain vacant positions. Under this policy, employees with greater
seniority receive a preference in bidding to transfer into covered positions for
which they are otherwise qualified.' 29 Unlike many such systems that are the
product of labor/management negotiations, 30 U.S. Air unilaterally adopted the
terms of this particular policy.' 3'
Robert Barnett worked for U.S. Air in a cargo-handling position.' In
1990, he injured his back and was transferred to a less physically demanding
position. 3 Mr. Barnett invoked his rights under U.S. Air's seniority system and
transferred to a less physically demanding mailroom position.'34 Under U.S. Air's
policy, the mailroom position subsequently became open for seniority-based
bidding.'35 Since two more senior employee's also intended to bid for the
mailroom position, Mr. Barnett asked U.S. Air to make an exception to the
seniority policy by allowing him 'to remain in the mailroom position as an
accommodation to his disability. 6 U.S. Air eventually denied this request and the
seniority bidding process resulted in Mr. Barnett losing employment.'37
Mr. Barnett sued claiming that U.S. Air's conduct violated the ADA.
More specifically, Mr. Barnett contended that he was an individual with a
disability who was qualified to perform the mailroom job, and that U.S. Air
violated the ADA by refusing to provide him with a reasonable accommodation by
reassigning him to the mailroom position.'38
The federal district court granted U.S. Air's motion for summary
judgment and dismissed Barnett's ADA claims as a matter of law.'39 The district
court reasoned that even if Barnett's requested reassignment to the mailroom
(ruling that an employer need not deviate from a policy of reassigning employees only if
they file a written transfer request form for the desired position).
129. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 395 (2002).
130. See supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text (discussing seniority
systems established by collective bargaining agreements).
131. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 404.







139. Id. at 395.
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position constituted a reasonable accommodation, the resulting violation of the
seniority policy would impose an undue hardship. 4 ' The court stated:
[T]he uncontroverted evidence shows that the USAir seniority
system has been in place for "decades" and governs over 14,000
USAir Agents. Moreover, seniority policies such as the one at issue
in this case are common to the airline industry. Given this context, it
seems clear that the USAir employees were justified in relying upon
the policy. As such, any significant alteration of that policy would
result in undue hardship to both the company and its non-disabled
employees."'4
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, reversed and held
that U.S. Air's seniority policy does not operate as a per se bar to reassignment
under the ADA.'42 Instead, the appeals court ruled that the impact of such a policy
is merely a factor that a court should consider in determining whether the
reassignment of a disabled employee would constitute an undue hardship.'43 The
appeals court explained that:
A case-by-case fact intensive analysis is required to determine
whether any particular reassignment would constitute an undue
hardship to the employer. If there is no undue hardship, a disabled
employee who seeks reassignment as a reasonable accommodation,
if otherwise qualified for a position, should receive the position
rather than merely have an opportunity to compete with non-
disabled employees.' 44
B. The Supreme Court's Decision
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether "[t]he [ADA]
requires an employer to reassign a disabled employee to a position as a 'reasonable
accommodation' even though another employee is entitled to hold the position
under the employer's bona fide and established seniority system."' 45 In attempting
to answer this question, the members of the Court issued five separate opinions.
By a slim five-vote majority, the Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision.
1. The Majority Opinion
Justice Breyer authored the majority opinion. An unusual coalition
consisting of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and
Stevens joined in that opinion.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
143. ld. at 1120.
144. Id.
145. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 395-96.
952 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:931
a. The Positions of the Parties
The majority opinion begins its analysis by summarizing the dueling
positions of the parties as to what Congress meant to encompass in the term
"reasonable accommodation." U.S. Air contended that the ADA demands only
"equal" treatment for individuals with disabilities.'46 Consistent with this position,
U.S. Air argued that a requested accommodation that seeks "preferential"
treatment, such as an exception from a disability-neutral seniority system, is
inherently unreasonable. 4 '
In contrast, Barnett asserted that the term "reasonable accommodation" is
synonymous with that of an "effective" accommodation. 48 Pursuant to this view, a
workplace adjustment necessarily qualifies as a reasonable accommodation if it
effectively enables an individual with a disability to perform the essential
functions of the job.'49
Under Barnett's suggested interpretation, if a requested accommodation
effectively qualifies an individual with a disability for a position, such as a
reassignment to a position the employee is capable of performing, the employee
will prevail unless the employer can establish that this particular accommodation
imposes an undue hardship. According to Barnett, this position is consistent with
the generally accepted notion that an employee generally bears the burden of
establishing the existence of a reasonable accommodation, while an employer
bears the burden to demonstrate that such an accommodation will result in an
undue hardship. 5
b. The Theoretical Resolution
The majority opinion rejected both parties' positions and adopted an
intermediate view of what constitutes a reasonable accommodation. The Court
first disposed of U.S. Air's anti-preference argument. The Court reasoned that the
simple fact that an accommodation would permit a disabled employee to avoid the
impact of a neutral rule that others must obey does not necessarily make that
accommodation unreasonable.' 5' While leaving open the possibility that some
requests for preferential treatment might be unreasonable or work an undue
hardship, the Court ruled that the mere existence of a difference in treatment does
not create an "automatic exemption" from the ADA's reasonable accommodation
146. Id. at 397.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 399.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 400. See supra notes 46-55 and accompanying text (discussing how
the circuit courts have viewed the burden of proof allocation concerning the reasonable
accommodation/undue hardship analysis).
151. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 398.
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mandate.5 5 The Court explained its rationale for this conclusion in the following
passage:
[P]references will sometimes prove necessary to achieve the Act's
basic equal opportunity goal. The Act requires preferences in the
form of "reasonable accommodations" that are needed for those
with disabilities to obtain the same workplace opportunities that
those without disabilities automatically enjoy. By definition any
special "accommodation" requires the employer to treat an
employee with a disability differently, i.e., preferentially. And the
fact that the difference in treatment violates an employer's
disability-neutral rule cannot by itself place the accommodation
beyond the Act's potential reach.1
53
The majority opinion also rejected Barnett's contention that an
"effective" accommodation is necessarily a "reasonable accommodation." The
Court explained that the ordinary meaning of the terms "effective" and
"reasonable" are not synonymous. 5 0 Instead, the Court stated, "[l]t is the word
'accommodation,' not the word 'reasonable,' that conveys the need for
effectiveness."'5 Thus, a proposed accommodation could be effective in terms of
enabling job performance, yet still fall of short of being reasonable. As an
example, the Court noted, "a demand for an effective accommodation could prove
unreasonable because of its impact, not on business operations, but on fellow
employees."'5 6
Finally, as to the appropriate burden of proof allocation, the Court noted
with favor the "practical way" that several circuit courts have reconciled the
reasonable accommodation/undue hardship calculus.' Under that approach, an
employee can avoid a motion for summary judgment by showing that the
requested type of accommodation is "reasonable on its face," which the Court
describes as being "ordinarily" reasonable or reasonable "in the run of cases."'5
Once an employee has made such a showing, the employer then bears the burden
of persuasion to establish that the requested accommodation would result in an
undue hardship given the particular circumstances at issue.5 9
c. Practical Application
In applying these principles, the majority opinion concluded that
reassignment would not be reasonable in the run of cases in which it would
152. Id. at 399.
153. Id. at 397.
154. Id. at 400.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 401.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 402.
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conflict with the rules of a seniority system. 6 ' The Court also ruled that employers
need not submit "proof on a case-by-case basis that a seniority system should
prevail."'' The Court gave several reasons for these conclusions. First, the Court
found support in the decisions of several circuit courts holding that collectively
bargained seniority systems trump the ADA's reassignment provision.'62 Second,
the Court noted that the benefits of a seniority system are not confined to those
established through labor/management negotiations. Regardless of origin, "the
typical seniority system provides important employee benefits by creating, and
fulfilling, employee expectations of fair, uniform treatment."'63 Finally, and "most
important" to the Court, is the matter of predictability.'64 Seniority systems
implement "uniform, impersonal" guidelines for decision-making.'65 A case-by-
case balancing analysis, in contrast, would undermine employee expectations and
result in considerable uncertainty for all concerned.'66
The Court, nonetheless, recognized a limited exception to the
presumption that reassignment in the face of a conflicting seniority system
generally is unreasonable. The Court stated that an employee may show that
"special circumstances" warrant a finding that reassignment is reasonable under
the particular facts of the case.'67 The Court offered the following examples of
such circumstances:
The plaintiff might show, for example, that the employer, having
retained the right to change the seniority system unilaterally,
exercises that right fairly frequently, reducing employee
expectations that the system will be followed-to the point where
one more departure, needed to accommodate an individual with a
disability, will not likely make a difference. The plaintiff might
show that the system already contains exceptions such that, in the
circumstances, one further exception is unlikely to matter. 68
The Court went on to state that it did not mean for these examples "to exhaust the
kinds of showings that a plaintiff might make."' 69
Since the Court's analysis differed from that of the Ninth Circuit, the
Court vacated the appeals court's judgment. 70 The Court also remanded the case
for further proceedings consistent with its opinion."'
160. Id. at 403.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 403-04. This issue is discussed supra at notes 99-107 and
accompanying text.
163. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 404.
164. Id. at 404-05.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 405.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 406.
20031 REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION 955
2. The Concurring Opinions
Justice Stevens and Justice O'Connor authored separate concurring
opinions. Justice Stevens' opinion is quite short and primarily attempts to clarify
the Ninth Circuit's task upon remand.' 72 In terms of the pertinent legal issues,
Justice Stevens underscored that while the Ninth Circuit misread the ADA by
analyzing the impact of U.S. Air's seniority system as a matter of undue hardship
rather than of reasonable accommodation, the appeals court acted correctly by
rejecting the notion that such a system acts as a per se bar to reassignment.'73
Justice O'Connor's concurrence is more complicated. She begins her
opinion with the unusual twist of noting her disagreement with the majority
opinion in which she joined. Justice O'Connor stated that she would prefer to
judge the impact of a seniority system on a request for reassignment on the basis
of whether the seniority system is "legally enforceable."' 74 Under that approach, if
a seniority system provides a senior employee with a legal entitlement to the
position in question, then no vacancy occurs and reassignment necessarily is
unreasonable.' In spite of this preference for a test different than that articulated
in the majority opinion, she noted that the Court would fail to achieve a majority
ruling in this case without her fifth vote.'76 Thus, she explained, "Accordingly, in
order that the Court may adopt a rule, and because I believe the Court's rule will
often lead to the same outcome as the one I would have adopted, I join the Court's
opinion despite my concerns."' 77
Interestingly, Justice O'Connor's "similar" test would lead to a different
outcome in this case. As her opinion noted, U.S. Air's written seniority policy
contains an express disclaimer of enforceability.' Since no employee had an
enforceable right under this policy to bump into the mailroom job, that position
was vacant and Barnett's request for reassignment would have been reasonable
under Justice O'Connor's test. 17
9
3. The Dissenting Opinions
Justice Breyer's majority opinion drew criticism in separate dissenting
opinions issued by both the right and left wings of the Court. Justice Scalia, joined
by Justice Thomas, chastised the majority for unduly expanding the scope of an
employer's reassignment duty. Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, on the
171. Id.
172. See id. at 406-08 (Stevens, J., concurring).
173. Id. at 407.
174. Id. at 408 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
175. See id at 408-09.
176. Id. at 408.
177. Id.
178. See id at 409.
179. See id.
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other hand, criticized the majority opinion for overly limiting the scope of the
reassignment accommodation.
a. Justice Scalia's Dissent
The principal thrust of Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion is the
contention that the ADA only obligates employers to accommodate "disability-
related obstacles."' 8 A disability-related obstacle, according to Justice Scalia,
includes "those employment rules and practices that the employee's disability
prevents him from observing."'' Thus, Justice Scalia would find that an employer
is required to modify a work station that cannot accommodate a disabled
employee's wheelchair.'82 He would not find, however, that an employer must pay
a disabled employee more than others at the same grade level for physical therapy
that would promote greater comfort, but which is not needed for successful job
performance. 183
Turning specifically to the reassignment accommodation, Justice Scalia
criticized circuit court decisions such as Smith and Aka for requiring employers to
provide disabled employees with a preference in filling vacant positions even in
the face of disability-neutral rules and policies." 4 He maintained that the
reassignment accommodation, just like any other reasonable accommodation,
should compel the elimination only of disability-related obstacles.'85 In practical
application, this means that:
If he [a disabled individual seeking reassignment] is qualified for
that position, and no one else is seeking it, or no one else who seeks
it is better qualified, he must be given the position. But
"reassignment to a vacant position" does not envision the
elimination of obstacles to the employee's service in the new
position that have nothing to do with his disability-for example,
another employee's claim to that position under a seniority system,
or another employee's superior qualifications.' 86
As a final matter, Justice Scalia also criticized the majority opinion for
creating the "special circumstances" exception to the general rule that a requested
reassignment that would conflict with the terms of a seniority system is not a
reasonable accommodation.' 87 He finds the scope of this exception to be unclear,
extending not only to "unmask sham seniority systems" that create no meaningful
180. See id. at 412 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
181. Id. (emphasis in original).
182. Id. at 413.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 414-17. The Smith and Aka decisions are discussed supra at notes
113-17 and accompanying text.
185. See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 415-16 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 416.
187. Id. at 418.
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employee expectations, but also to undercut bona fide systems in some "vague and
unspecified" way.188 This exemption, he concluded, will result in a "state of
uncertainty that can be resolved only by constant litigation." '89
b. Justice Souter's Dissent
Justice Souter would affirm the Ninth Circuit's decision. He would find
that Barnett's requested accommodation was reasonable and that the employer
should be required to show that the requested reassignment would result in an
undue hardship.
Justice Souter initially determined that a unilaterally established seniority
system should enjoy no special protection under the ADA. 9 He pointed to the fact
that, unlike Title VII, nothing in the ADA expressly insulates seniority rules from
the reasonable accommodation requirement. 9' In addition, he noted that the
ADA's legislative history indicates that seniority provisions contained in a
collective bargaining agreement should not amount to more than "a factor" in
determining the appropriateness of a particular accommodation.'92 Since the
seniority system here was adopted unilaterally by U.S. Air and is not protected by
a positive federal statute such as the National Labor Relations Act," 3 Justice
Souter concluded that it too is not entitled automatically to trump the ADA's
reasonable accommodation requirement."'
Turning to the particular facts of the case, Justice Souter would find that
Barnett sufficiently established that his request to occupy the mailroom position
constituted a reasonable accommodation.' 95 Justice Souter noted that Barnett
already had filled the position for two years such that his request represented "not
a change but a continuation in the status quo."' 96 In contrast, U.S. Air "took pains
to ensure that its seniority rules raised no great expectations."' 97 Under these
circumstances, Justice Souter concluded, the Ninth Circuit was correct in finding
that Barnett's request was reasonable and in placing the burden on U.S. Air to
come forward with proof that the request, in fact, would impose an undue
hardship. '98
188. Id. at 419.
189. Id. at 420.
190. See id. at 420-23 (Souter, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 420-21. Title VII contains a provision that explicitly authorizes an
employer to provide different benefits to employees pursuant to a bona fide seniority
system. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2003).
192. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 421.
193. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2003).




198. Id. at 424.
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V. ANSWERS, QUESTIONS, AND SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS
This Part attempts a critical analysis of the impact of the Barnett decision
on the issues of reasonable accommodation and reassignment. As this decision
represents the Supreme Court's initial foray into this territory, the Court's
pronouncements have the. potential for great significance concerning the future
development of ADA jurisprudence.
The following sections address the various answers and questions
resulting from Barnett with respect to reasonable accommodation, in general, and
reassignment, in particular. Since we are used to thinking in a more linear fashion
in terms of questions first and answers second, it may seem odd to reverse that
order in this instance. But, the Barnett decision does not provide a very linear
approach to the issues of reasonable accommodation and reassignment. The five
opinions issued in that decision depict a Court with widely divergent views of the
ADA's objectives and mechanics. These opinions also raise or avoid as many
questions as they provide answers.
The following sections, accordingly, will first summarize the answers
provided by Barnett concerning the scope of the reasonable accommodation
obligation and the reassignment accommodation. The sections then will discuss
the questions that remain uncertain in Barnett's aftermath. Finally, the sections
will provide policy-based suggestions as to how the remaining questions should be
resolved in the future.
A. Reasonable Accommodation
1. Answers
As the first Supreme Court case to address the unique reasonable
accommodation prong of the ADA's anti-discrimination formula, the Court in
Barnett had the opportunity to resolve numerous issues concerning the scope of
the reasonable accommodation duty. Among these opportunities, the majority
opinion in Barnett provided clear guidance as to the following:
The reasonable accommodation and undue hardship concepts are not
identical. Justice Breyer explained that the reasonable accommodation inquiry
focuses generally on whether a work-related adjustment or modification is
"reasonable on its face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run of cases."' 99 The undue
hardship inquiry, in contrast, focuses more narrowly to determine whether such an
accommodation would impose a significant burden on the employer "in the
particular circumstances. "20 Thus, these two concepts resemble the opposite ends
of a telescope with one end focusing broadly and the other focusing narrowly.
199. Id. at 402.
200. Id.
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In general, the employee bears the burden of proving a reasonable
accommodation, while the employer bears the burden of proving that such an
accommodation would impose an undue hardship. The Court cited with favor a
number of lower court decisions that "have reconciled the phrases 'reasonable
accommodation' and 'undue hardship' in a practical way." '' In accordance with
the general approach adopted in those cases, the employee must establish that an
accommodation is reasonable in the run of cases, with the burden of persuasion
then shifting to the employer "to show special (typically case-specific)
circumstances that demonstrate undue hardship in the particular circumstances."2 2
An "effective" accommodation is not necessarily a "reasonable"
accommodation. The Court rejected Barnett's argument that an employee need
show only that an accommodation will be effective in terms of enabling job
performance in order to establish that accommodation's reasonableness. 23 The
Barnett majority opinion explained that some accommodations, such as a
requested exception to a seniority policy, 24 may be unreasonable even though
effective in facilitating successful job performance. Thus, an employee, in order to
carry its burden, must show that an accommodation is both effective and otherwise
reasonable in the run of cases.
If an accommodation is not reasonable in the run of cases, the burden
rests with the employee to establish reasonableness in the particular
circumstances. This conclusion flows as a corollary of the previous two
conclusions. If the employee bears the burden of proof on the issue of reasonable
accommodation, but does not establish that a desired accommodation is reasonable
in the run of cases, the employee will not prevail even if the accommodation does
not impose an undue hardship.0 5 In these circumstances, the employee will be able
to shift the burden of proof to the employer only if he or she can show "special
circumstances [sufficient to] warrant a finding that . . . the requested
'accommodation' is 'reasonable' on the particular facts."20 6
The fact that a particular accommodation may provide a "preference" to
a disabled individual does not necessarily make the accommodation unreasonable.
The Court also rejected U.S. Airways contention that the ADA does not require
accommodations that would treat individuals with disabilities more favorably than
other workers. The Court explained that, under the ADA, some preferential
accommodations are deemed necessary in order to permit the disabled to obtain
the same work opportunities as the non-disabled °.2 7 Thus, "the simple fact that an
201. Id. at 401.
202. Id. at 402.
203. Id. at 400-01.
204. See id at 403-05 (holding that a mandated deviation from a seniority system
is not reasonable in the run of cases).
205. See id. at 403.
206. Id. at 405.
207. Id. at 397.
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accommodation would provide a preference . . . cannot, in and of itself,
automatically show that the accommodation is not 'reasonable.""'2 8
2. Questions
In spite of these pronouncements, the Barnett decision leaves
considerable uncertainty in its wake. With regard to the general scope of the
reasonable accommodation requirement, two unanswered questions loom
particularly large.
a. Beyond effectiveness, what other considerations are appropriate in
determining the reasonableness of an accommodation, and what are the
respective burden of proof allocations with respect to these
considerations?
Justice Breyer's opinion, as noted above, rejected the argument that an
accommodation that effectively enables job performance is automatically a
"reasonable" accommodation.0 9 The majority opinion found that Barnett's
requested reassignment, even though effective in terms of enabling Barnett to
successfully perform the essential functions of the mailroom position, was not
reasonable because it would violate U.S. Air's seniority system and thereby
frustrate "employee expectations of fair, uniform treatment."2 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court commented more generally in support of the notion that an
accommodation's negative impact on co-employees may render an
accommodation unreasonable:
Nor does an ordinary English meaning of the term "reasonable
accommodation" make of it a simple, redundant mirror image of the
term "undue hardship." The statute refers to an "undue hardship on
the operation of the business." Yet, a demand for an effective
accommodation could prove unreasonable because of its impact, not
on business operations, but on fellow employees-say because it
will lead to dismissals, relocations, or modification of employee
benefits to which an employer, looking at the matter fiom the
perspective of the business itself, may be relatively indifferent. 21 I
While the above-quoted passage makes an accommodation's impact onl
co-employees part of the calculus for determining reasonableness, it also may be
construed as suggesting that an accommodation's impact on the employer is not.
At least one plausible interpretation of this language is that an accommodation's
impact on the employer's business operation is a matter of, and solely a matter of,
208. Id. at 398 (emphasis in original).
209. See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
210. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 404.
211. Id. at 400-01 (citation omitted).
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undue hardship analysis. Clearly, the statute21 2 and the regulations 213 contemplate
that an accommodation's impact on the employer primarily will be scrutinized at
the undue hardship stage. The EEOC's stance in litigation is consistent with the
interpretation that the matter of employer impacts is relevant only with respect to
the undue hardship analysis.
214
Such a conclusion, however, is far from inevitable. The Barnett Court
may have intended this passage only to illustrate that the reasonable
accommodation and undue hardship concepts are not wholly identical since an
accommodation's impact falls solely within the realm of reasonable
accommodation analysis. This, conceivably, could leave the matter of an
accommodation's impact on the employer relevant at both stages. This latter
construction finds support in several circuit court decisions that have ruled that the
cost of an accommodation is relevant to the issue of reasonableness as well as to
the issue of undue hardship.21 The Seventh Circuit, for example, has ruled that an
employee must show at the reasonable accommodation stage that a proposed
accommodation not only is efficacious but also that its benefits are not
disproportionate to its costs. 216 If the employee satisfies this burden, the employer
then "has an opportunity to prove that upon more careful consideration the costs
are excessive in relation either to the benefits of the accommodation or to the
employer's financial survival or health."2 7 Given the number and prominence of
these decisions, it could be argued that Justice Breyer likely would have written
more explicitly if he intended a departure from their holdings.
Another perspective for viewing this same issue concerns the appropriate
division of burden of proof responsibilities with respect to the reasonable
accommodation and undue hardship elements of the ADA's anti-discrimination
formula. In discussing this issue, the majority opinion first appears to agree with
Barnett's assertion that the "statute imposes the burden of demonstrating an 'undue
hardship' upon the employer, while the burden of proving 'reasonable
accommodation' remains with the . . . employee."" 8 The Court then cited with
favor the "practical" approach adopted by a number of circuit court decisions.
219
According to the Court, these decisions place the burden on the employee to show
212. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (2003) (describing the undue hardship defense in
relation to the financial and administrative burden that an accommodation may impose
upon the employer).
213. See 29 C.F.R. § 16 30 .2(p) (2003).
214. See, e.g., Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254, 259 (1st Cir. 2001)
(noting that the EEOC, in an amicus brief, urged the position that whether an
accommodation would be too costly or difficult is entirely for the employer to establish).
215. See, e.g., id at 260; Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138
(2d Cir. 1995); Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542-43 (7th Cir.
1995).
216. Iande Zande, 44 F.3d at 543.
217. Id.
218. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 400 (2002).
219. See id. at 401.
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that an accommodation is reasonable in the run of cases. 2 If such is demonstrated,
the burden then shifts to the employer to show special circumstances "that
demonstrate undue hardship in the particular circumstances."22'
The problem with the Court's analysis is that the circuit court decisions
that it cites with favor do not all adopt the same burden of proof rules. The District
of Columbia Circuit Court in Barth v. Gelb,222 for example, takes the position that
the employee generally is responsible for establishing the existence and
reasonableness of a proposed accommodation, while the employer bears the
burden of proving the undue hardship defense.223 This approach places on the
employee the entire burden of proof with respect to the reasonable accommodation
issue.224 In contrast, the First and Second Circuit Courts have adopted formulations
that split the burden of proof with respect to the reasonable accommodation
issue."' The Second Circuit, in Borkowski v. Valley Central School District, ruled
that an employee bears only a burden of production that is satisfied if the
employee "suggest[s] the existence of a plausible accommodation, the costs of
which, facially, do not clearly exceed its benefits." 2 6 The employer, however,
bears the ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of reasonableness, which
"merges, in effect, with its burden of showing, as an affirmative defense, that the
proposed accommodation would cause it to suffer an undue hardship. '227 The First
Circuit has adopted a similar standard in Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc.22' The
Barnett Court's discussion of the burden of proof rules simply does not reach the
level of precision to indicate which, if either of these two formulations, it intends
to endorse.
Thus, regardless of whether this issue is viewed through the lens of
determining which considerations are relevant to the reasonableness of an
accommodation or, alternatively, through the lens of determining the proper
allocation of burden of proof responsibilities, the unanswered question remains the
same: what role should the matter of costs and other impacts on the employer play
at the reasonable accommodation stage? If the issue of costs and other employer
burdens are exclusively within the province of undue hardship analysis, then the
employee, under any formulation of the burden of proof rules, will not carry a
burden of non-persuasion on these issues. On the other hand, if the employee bears
some responsibility for these issues at the reasonable accommodation stage, his or
her road becomes more difficult.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 402.
222. 2 F.3d 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
223. Id. at 1186-87.
224. Id.
225. See Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254, 259 (Ist Cir. 2001);
Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1995).
226. Borkowski, 63 F.3d at 138.
227. Id.
228. See Reed, 244 F.3d at 258.
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This is no trifling matter. The Ninth Circuit, in its Barnett decision,
viewed the impact of the seniority system as relevant only at the undue hardship
stage. 22' The Supreme Court, in contrast, analyzed the impact of the seniority
system as a matter of reasonable accommodation."' That change in focus
effectively reversed the applicable burden of proof and likely presages the
eventual outcome of the Barnett case itself. Determining the appropriate analytical
framework for assessing an accommodation's costs and other burdens on the
employer may carry a similar significance.
b. When, if ever, does a preference in favor of a disabled individual fall
beyond the scope of a mandated reasonable accommodation?
The Barnett majority rejected U.S. Air's contention that an employer is
not required to provide a reasonable accommodation which results in the
preferential treatment of a disabled employee. U.S. Air argued that the ADA only
requires the equal treatment of individuals with disabilities, but not preferential
treatment such as an exemption from a disability-neutral workplace rule that
applies to all employees.23" ' The Court rejected this argument stating, "[t]he simple
fact that an accommodation would provide a 'preference'-in the sense that it
would permit the worker with a disability to violate a rule that others must obey-
cannot, in and of itself, automatically show that the accommodation is not
'reasonable. 11232
While a request for preferential treatment does not create an "automatic
exemption" from the reasonable accommodation requirement, 23 3 the Court did not
foreclose the possibility that requests for preferential treatment, at some point, may
be unreasonable or work an undue hardship. The unanswered question following
Barnett is at what point, if any, does it becomes unreasonable to require an
employer to provide preferential treatment as an accommodation to a disabled
employee.
Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion offers one possible line of
demarcation. As noted above,"3 Justice Scalia construes the ADA as only
requiring accommodations that remedy "disability-related obstacles."23 The ADA,
in his view, is intended to eliminate workplace barriers "that would not be barriers
but for the employee's disability." '236 To illustrate this approach, Justice Scalia
stated that he would find that an employer is required to modify a work station that
cannot accommodate a disabled employee's wheelchair, but not to pay a disabled
229. See Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
230. See U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401-06 (2002).
231. See id at 397.
232. Id. at 398 (emphasis in original).
233. Id. at 397-98.
234. See supra notes 180-86 and accompanying text.
235. See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 413-14 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 413 (emphasis in original).
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employee more than others at the same grade level to compensate for the costs of
physical therapy that would enable the employee to work with as little discomfort
as other employees.237 Applying this analysis to the Barnett facts, Justice Scalia
concluded that Barnett is not entitled to the mailroom reassignment since such an
accommodation would displace a neutral seniority system rather than a disability-
related obstacle.238
Justice Scalia's opinion cites with favor a number of lower court
decisions that have ruled that the ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement
does not compel employers to make exceptions to neutral transfer and assignment
policies.239 These decisions generally view the ADA as embodying an equal
treatment model that simply bans discrimination on the basis of disability.2 40
Pursuant to this view, compelling an employer to deviate from a legitimate non-
discriminatory policy would amount to a prohibited preference akin to affirmative
action. 21 ' The Fifth Circuit in Daugherty v. City of El Paso, aptly summarized this
position as follows:
[W]e do not read the ADA as requiring affirmative action in favor
of individuals with disabilities, in the sense of requiring that
disabled persons be given priority in hiring or reassignment over
those who are not disabled. It prohibits employment discrimination
against qualified individuals with disabilities, no more and no
less.242
The Barnett majority purportedly "reject[s] the position taken by U.S.
Airways and Justice Scalia" with respect to the issue of preferential treatment.2 43
But, as Justice Scalia noted, his position and that of U.S. Air are not identical.244 In
contrast to U.S. Air, Justice Scalia does not argue against preferences in all
instances, but only when directed at obstacles that are not disability-related.245
Moreover, the majority opinion ultimately agreed with Justice Scalia that
reassignment generally is not reasonable in the face of a conflicting seniority
system. 46 Thus, Justice Scalia's recommended approach may retain vitality in
spite of the majority's criticism.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 416.
239. Id. at 416-17.
240. See, e.g., EEOC v. Hurniston-Keeling, Inc. 227 F.3d 1024, 1028-29 (7th
Cir. 2000); Duckett v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 120 F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir. 1997);
Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1995).
241. See, e.g., Hunfiston-Keeling, 227 F.3d at 1028-29 (describing the EEOC's
view on reassignment as constituting "affirmative action with a vengeance").
242. 56 F.3d at 700.
243. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 398.
244. Id. at 417-18 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
245. See id at 412-18.
246. Id. at 404-05.
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The Barnett majority may have provided a somewhat different standard
for assessing preferential accommodations. In rejecting U.S. Air's argument that
preferential treatment is inherently unreasonable, Justice Breyer stated that
"preferences will sometimes prove necessary to achieve the Act's basic equal
opportunity goal. The Act requires preferences in the form of 'reasonable
accommodations' that are needed for those with disabilities to obtain the same
workplace opportunities that those without disabilities automatically enjoy. '247
This statement, although not asserted as establishing a standard for testing the
limits of preferential accommodations, may be interpreted as suggesting that
preferential accommodations may be appropriate in order to provide a disabled
worker with the same opportunities that those without a disability enjoy, but not
those that provide different or more generous opportunities. Such a distinction,
however, as discussed below,248 may lack precision in predicting the contours of
the reasonable accommodation obligation.
3. Suggested Solutions
a. Components of Reasonable Accommodation and the Burden of Proof
Allocation
In looking for the most suitable approach for allocating the parties'
respective evidentiary burdens in implementing the ADA's reasonable
accommodation/undue hardship calculus, it may be helpful to start by identifying
that part of the formula that is not in dispute. As the Barnett majority suggested,
the matter of how an accommodation impacts an employer should be a subject for
inquiry primarily at the undue hardship stage.24 The ADA defines "undue
hardship" to mean "significant difficulty or expense" and expressly makes relevant
such factors as the cost of the accommodation, the financial resources of the
employer, and the impact of the accommodation on the employer's business
operations. 2" These factors all relate to information that is most easily accessible
to the employer, and it is well established that the employer carries the burden of
proof to establish the undue hardship defense.2"'
The more difficult issue concerns the reasonable accommodation portion
of the formula. On this score, the Second Circuit's decision in Borkowski appears
to best balance the competing interests at stake. In Borkowski, the Second Circuit
split the burden of establishing the reasonable accommodation element between
247. Id. at 397.
248. See infra notes 295-98 and accompanying text.
249. See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 400.
250. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (2003).
251. See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 400 (stating that the ADA's imposition of the
burden of demonstrating an undue hardship upon the employer "seems sensible in that an
employer can more frequently and easily prove the presence of business hardship than an
employee can prove its absence").
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the parties by taking into account the reasonableness of an accommodation's
cost.,,,
The Second Circuit, first of all, properly determined that the financial
costs of an accommodation are relevant at both the reasonable accommodation and
undue hardship stages. 53 As the Supreme Court in Barnett explained, the
reasonable accommodation stage asks whether an accommodation generally is
reasonable in the run of cases, while the undue hardship stage asks whether the
accommodation poses an undue burden in the particular circumstances.254 The
costs of a proposed accommodation are relevant to each of these questions. The
ADA explicitly recognizes that costs are central to undue hardship analysis by
focusing on whether the cost of a proposed accommodation would pose an undue
financial burden on that particular employer. 5 But, costs also are relevant at the
more generalized reasonable accommodation stage in terms of focusing on
whether a proposed accommodation generally provides benefits that are
commensurate with the cost of the accommodation.256 As the Seventh Circuit has
recognized, a proposed accommodation generally may be unreasonable because its
costs are disproportionate to the resulting benefits, even though the employer may
not be faced with significant expense or financial ruin if required to provide such
an accommodation. 7 Thus, as a matter of reasonable accommodation, an
accommodation should be deemed reasonable only if it passes a rough cost-benefit
analysis.
The remaining unanswered question concerns the appropriate division of
responsibilities for proving the impact of costs at the reasonable accommodation
stage. The EEOC258 and those courts... that have suggested that the employee
should bear no portion of the burden of proof with respect to the issue of costs are
misplaced. The employee, after all, is the party who is in the best position to have
information relevant to his or her impairments and to the type of accommodation
the employee believes is desirable and appropriate to enable successful job
performance. On the other hand, those circuit court decisions that place the burden
of proof at the reasonable accommodation stage entirely on the employee go too
far in the opposite direction.26 The employer, after all, is the party who is in the
best position to have information relevant to the actual costs and administrative
impacts of a proposed accommodation. Finally, each party potentially has
252. Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 137-38 (2d Cir. 1995).
The Borkowski decision is discussed supra at notes 225-27.
253. Borkowski, 63 F.3d at 138.
254. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 401-02.
255. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10).
256. See Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254, 258 (Ist Cir. 2001);
Borkowski, 63 F.3d at 138.
257. Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542-43 (7th Cir. 1995).
258. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
259. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
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information relevant to the relative weight of an accommodation's general costs
and benefits.
The test adopted by the Second Circuit in Borkowski properly takes these
considerations into account. Under that approach, the employee bears a burden of
production to identify a plausible accommodation, "the costs of which, facially, do
not clearly exceed its benefits."26' This is a relatively low hurdle that an employee
clears by producing evidence to show that a proposed accommodation is likely to
enable job performance without being wholly disproportionate in terms of costs.
The employer then is charged with carrying the ultimate burden of persuasion on
the issue of reasonableness, which, in effect, merges, with burden of showing that
the proposed accommodation would impose an undue hardship. 6 2 Under this
approach, the employer bears the principal burden of showing that an
accommodation is too costly or that it otherwise would impose significant
operational burdens on the employer's business. The Borkowski test, accordingly,
appropriately balances the pertinent policy interests at issue, and further benefits
from the fact that it has been endorsed by a growing number of other circuit court
decisions.263
b. Preferences, Affirmative Action, and Reasonable Accommodations
American society is widely skeptical of the appropriateness of affirmative
action on the basis of race or gender. 264 Some potential forms of reasonable
accommodation entail the preferential treatment of disabled individuals in a
manner that arguably resembles affirmative action. 26 Courts and commentators
alike have raised the alarm that the reasonable accommodation concept must be
cabined by strict guidelines to prevent the ADA from becoming a vehicle for
affirmative action. 66 This attempt at line-drawing, however, is misguided.
Reasonable accommodation under the ADA is not only different from affirmative
261. Borkowski, 63 F.3d at 139.
262. Id. at 138.
263. See, e.g., Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254, 258 (1st Cir. 2001);
Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542-43 (7th Cir. 1995).
264. See, e.g., Diller, supra note 9, at 44 ("affirmative action has been
controversial at every turn"); William Bradford Reynolds, An Experiment Gone Awry, in
THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEBATE 130 (George E. Curry ed., 1996) (arguing that
affirmative action is inherently discriminatory); Mark C. Weber, Beyond the Americans
with Disabilities Act: A National Employment Policyfor People with Disabilities, 46 BUFF.
L. REv. 123, 145 (1998) ("Affirmative action on the basis of race has been the subject of
immense controversy.").
265. See Stephen F. Befort & Tracey Holmes Donesky, Reassignment Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act: Reasonable Accommodation, Affirmative Action, or Both?,
57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1045, 1081-82 (2000) (discussing the similarities between
reasonable accommodation and affirmative action).
266. See supra notes 108-12, 123-28 (courts), infra note 271 (commentators),
and accompanying text.
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action under Title VII or the equal protection clause," 7 but it serves a different
purpose. Since the reasonable accommodation notion calls for certain types of
preferential adjustments in order to assist the disabled in becoming and remaining
productive members of the workforce,268 we would do better to evaluate the merits
of individual accommodations in terms of serving this purpose than to draw lines
in the sand attempting to identify the permissible parameters of preferential
accommodations.
To begin with, it is clear that the ADA's reasonable accommodation
obligation requires some preferential treatment of the disabled. For example, if a
disabled employee requests a workplace adjustment such as a slightly elevated
work station in order to perform his or her job duties, the fact that the employer
provides only lower work stations to other employees does not automatically make
such a request unreasonable. The ADA quite clearly compels employers to provide
favorable workplace adjustments to the disabled regardless of whether those same
adjustments are provided to the nondisabled.269 As the Barnett Court itself
acknowledged, "[b]y definition any special 'accommodation' requires the
employer to treat an employee with a disability differently, i.e., preferentially."27 °
The preferential nature of the reasonable accommodation obligation is
discomforting to many. A number or commentators have characterized the ADA
as imposing a radical affirmative action requirement.27" ' Similarly, negative
affirmative action rhetoric has found its way into a number of court decisions,
particularly those examining the applicability of the reassignment
accommodation.272
As this Author has argued elsewhere in more detail,272 however,
significant differences distinguish affirmative action with respect to race and
gender, on the one hand, and reasonable accommodation under the ADA, on the
other. Conventional affirmative action programs consist of pre-designed policies
267. See infra notes 273-80 and accompanying text.
268. See infra notes 284-88 and accompanying text.
269. See Diller, supra note 9, at 43 (stating that the affirmative action and
reasonable accommodation concepts both "rely on visions of equality that call for
differential treatment of the subordinated individual or group").
270. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 397 (2002).
271. See, e.g., CHARLES LAWRENCE III & MARI MATSUDA, WE WON'T Go BACK:
MAKING THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 108 (1997) (calling the ADA the most radical
affirmative action program in U.S. history); Sandra R. Levitsky, Reasonably
Accommodating Race: Lessons fiom the ADA for Race-Targeted Affirmative Action, 18
LAW & INEQ. 85, 85 (1999) (describing the ADA as "one of the most radical affirmative
action laws in recent U.S. history").
272. See supra notes 108-12, 123-28 and accompanying text; see also Ruth
Colker, Affirmative Protections for People with Disabilities, Illness and Parenting
Responsibilities under United States Law, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 213, 222 (1997) ("The
controversy surrounding whether or not the ADA is an 'affirmative action' statute has
largely centered on [the reassignment to a vacant position] requirement.").
273. Befort & Donesky, supra note 265, at 1082-86.
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by which employers seek to increase the proportion of a historically
underrepresented minority group in its overall workforce. 274 Employers typically
establish target goals through a statistical comparison of their workforce with the
relevant labor market. Once a plan is established, an employer implements the
plan throughout its recruitment and hiring processes until the numerical goals for
the underrepresented group are met.275 In contrast, reasonable accommodation
under the ADA occurs on a much more individualized basis.276 The reasonable
accommodation process occurs only after the employer and disabled employee
have engaged in an interactive process designed to identify both the essential
functions of the position and the special needs of the disabled person. -2 77
Viewed in this light, reassignment under the ADA is much less pervasive
than conventional affirmative action programs in several respects. First, the
reassignment accommodation applies only to employees and not to applicants.2 8
Second, reassignment does not involve the setting of pre-determined numerical
goals or quotas. Third, no other employee loses employment as a result of a job
reassignment since such a transfer occurs only to an already vacant position..2 79 In
short, reassignment operates only as a post-hire mechanism by which an employer
may retain the services of a current employee with a disability, while affirmative
action operates as a pre-hire formula that reserves employment opportunities for
one group of applicants at the expense of another group of applicants.280
An even more significant distinction flows from the different anti-
discrimination formulas embodied in Title VII and the ADA. Title VII utilizes an
equal treatment model of discrimination. 8' By prohibiting discrimination
274. See Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination,
and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 17 (describing conventional affirmative
action plans).
275. See id
276. See id. at 14 (stating that "accommodation is far likelier to involve
personalized special treatment").
277. See C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (1999) (stating that determination of an
appropriate reasonable accommodation requires the employer to engage in an "informal,
interactive process" with the qualified individual with a disability).
278. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text (stating that reassignment is
available to employees, not applicants).
279. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text (stating that an employer
need only reassign a disabled employee to a vacant position).
280. See Befort & Donesky, supra note 265, at 1085.
281. For a discussion of the equal treatment model of anti-discrimination statutes,
see generally Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 235,
237 (1971) (describing Title VII's "norm of colorblindness"); Paul Steven Miller,
Disability Civil Rights and a New Paradigm for the Twenty-First Century: The Expansion
of Civil Rights Beyond Race, Gender and Age, I U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 511, 515 (1998)
(describing the traditional civil rights paradigm as one requiring an "equal playing field"
for all workers).
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"because of' certain listed characteristics such as an employee's race or gender," 2
Title VII compels employers to make employment decisions without reference to
those listed traits. Prohibited discrimination occurs whenever an employer decides
not to hire someone because of a specific trait, or conversely, whenever an
employer takes favorable account of a person's race or gender in making an
employment decision. Thus, except for very narrowly tailored, voluntary plans,
28 3
most employer efforts at affirmative action are prohibited under statutes
containing an equal treatment model of discrimination.
The ADA goes beyond the equal treatment model to also require different
treatment by compelling employers to provide reasonable accommodations to
otherwise qualified individuals with a disability. 84 Under this different treatment
model, an employer who merely refrains from treating disabled employees
differently than non-disabled employees may be engaging in prohibited
discrimination." 5 The incorporation of the reasonable accommodation requirement
in the ADA, accordingly, represents Congress' recognition that "in order to treat
some persons equally, we must treat them differently."8 6
The preamble to the ADA provides some guidance as to why preferences
are not only lawful, but are required, under the ADA. One of Congress's principal
motivations for enacting the ADA was to help disabled individuals enter into and
remain in the American workplace. 7 In its "findings and purposes" section,
Congress states that "the Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with
disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent
living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals. 2 8
282. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994). Title VII also protects against
discrimination on the basis of color, religion, or national origin. Id.
283. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 628-30 (1987)
(describing criteria necessary to validate voluntary affirmative action program); Taxman v.
Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1560 (3d Cir. 1996) (rejecting a school board's affirmative
action plan designed to increase cultural diversity).
284. For a discussion of how the ADA adopts a different treatment model of anti-
discrimination law, see generally Diller, supra note 9, at 40-44 (noting that the "ADA
relies on a different treatment vision of equality"); Miller, supra note 281, at 514, 516-21
(describing the new civil rights paradigm as one that "recasts the notion of a 'level' playing
field into one of an 'accessible' playing field").
285. See Miller, supra note 281, at 514 ("For disabled people who need
reasonable accommodations in order to perform the essential functions of their jobs, 'equal'
treatment is tantamount to a barrier to employment, not a gateway."); Weber, supra note
264, at 146 ("[l]t is impossible to deny that for disability, if for no other characteristic,
perfectly equal treatment can constitute discrimination.").
286. Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 274, at 10.
287. See Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein, Reasonable Accommodations
Under the ADA, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 361, 368 (2002) (finding that the ADA's intended goal is
"to increase opportunities for disabled individuals to live productive lives").
288. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(8) (2003).
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This objective likely explains Congress' decision to adopt a different
treatment model of discrimination in the ADA. While consideration of a person's
race and gender may be inappropriate because neither characteristic bears any
inherent relationship to an individual's work-related abilities, consideration of a
person's disability may be required because the individual's impairment often is
directly related to his or her ability to perform the job.289 Reasonable
accommodation thus ensures that disabled persons are not deprived of job
opportunities they otherwise might not have access to under a disability-blind
statute.290
The bottom line, accordingly, is that preferential treatment is not inimical
to the ADA's purpose, but part and parcel of the statutory design for enabling the
disabled to move into the mainstream of American life and its workforce. Once it
is recognized that preferential treatment in the form of reasonable
accommodations is an integral part of the ADA, it becomes clear that line-drawing
attempts to ban preferential accommodations are counter-productive.
This conclusion is underscored by the shortcomings of the two line-
drawing attempts discussed above. Justice Scalia would require only those
preferential accommodations that alleviate "disability-related obstacles."29' In the
context of the Barnett facts, Justice Scalia maintained that Barnett was not entitled
to the mailroom reassignment because the obstacle in question, U.S. Air's
seniority policy, was not disability-related.292 Justice Scalia's proposed test,
however, would largely remove reassignment from the available arsenal of
available reasonable accommodations, even though that type of accommodation is
expressly listed in the statute.2 93 An employer could avoid the necessity of
reassigning disabled employees simply by adopting various facially neutral
289. See Diller, supra note 9, at 40 (observing that "unlike race, disability is
frequently a legitimate consideration in employment decisions.").
290. See Ransom v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 983 F.Supp. 895, 901 (D. Ariz. 1997)
(stating that the ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement "serve[s] as a method of
leveling the playing field between disabled and nondisabled employees, in the sense of
enabling a disabled worker to do the job without creating undue hardship on the
employer"); Diller, supra note 9, at 41 ("[T]he reasonable accommodation requirement is
not a means of giving people with disabilities a special benefit or advantage; rather, it is a
means of equalizing the playing field so that people with disabilities are not disadvantaged
by the fact -that the workplace ignores their needs."); Weber, supra note 264, at 146
("[O]nce the need for different treatment is recognized, affirmative action for persons with
disabilities emerges as one of many forms of different treatment that might be needed to
achieve equality."); R. George Wright, Persons with Disabilities and the Meaning of
Constitutional Equal Protection, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 145, 162-73 (1999) (arguing that
equality for individuals with severe disabilities requires treatment that takes these
disabilities into account).
291. See U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 412-13 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
292. Seeid. at 414-16.
293. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2003).
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transfer and assignment policies that, according to Justice Scalia, would
automatically trump any duty to reassign. Moreover, Justice Scalia's application of
the disability-related concept in Barnett is questionable. Barnett sought a job
reassignment only because his disability eliminated his capacity to perform the
functions of his former position. Thus, Barnett's request for a job reassignment
certainly was related to his disability, even if the seniority system, in the abstract,
was not. Since the practical impact of whether a reassignment request is granted
for someone in Barnett's shoes is to determine whether the disabled employee
continues to have a job with that employer, the objectives of the ADA are not
served by Justice Scalia's proposed line.294
The potential boundary gleaned from the Barnett majority opinion comes
from Justice Breyer's assertion that preferential accommodations may be
necessary to enable the disabled "to obtain the same workplace opportunities that
those without disabilities automatically enjoy." '295 While this principle is far more
preferable than that espoused by Justice Scalia and probably would suggest an
appropriate outcome in most circumstances, it too overly restricts the availability
of preferential accommodations needed to effectuate the ADA's objectives. Take
for example, the case of a disabled employee who seeks, as a reasonable
accommodation, to take a leave of absence for the purposes of obtaining medical
treatment and recuperation.296 If the length of the requested leave is beyond that
afforded by the employer's documented leave policy, the request arguably is
unreasonable in terms of asking for a more generous opportunity than that
available to other employees. The First Circuit Court of Appeals in Garcia-Ayala
v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc.,297 however, flatly rejected such a rule. The court in
that case refused to adopt a per se rule of unreasonableness and, instead, looked to
the totality of the circumstances and found that the employer had failed to show
that the longer leave period would cause an undue hardship.298 Of course, the First
Circuit, simply, may be wrong. But, I do not think so.
Ultimately then, the reach of the reasonable accommodation duty under
the ADA should stand on its own merits and serve the ADA's unique purposes. An
accommodation should be required under the ADA if it would enable the
employee to perform the job, is reasonable in the run of cases, and would not
impose an undue hardship on the particular facts. This standard should not be
muddied further by importing inapplicable concerns about affirmative action or
preferences.
294. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text (discussing the EEOC's view
that reassignment is the accommodation of last resort).
295. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 397.
296. See ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 40 (recognizing leave for
obtaining medical treatment or for recuperating from an illness to be permissible bases for a
reasonable accommodation request).
297. 212 F.3d 638, 646 (1st Cir. 2000).
298. Id. at 647-50.
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B. Reassignment
1. Answers
The Barnett decision also provided some guidance on the application of
the more specific reassignment accommodation. These answers include the
following:
An employer's unilaterally established seniority system for filling vacant
positions will trump the ADA's reassignment accommodation in the run of cases.
The Barnett majority made it clear that reassignment generally will not be
reasonable when such action requires an exception to an employer's established
seniority system for filling vacant positions. 99 By placing the onus on the
employee to prove the reasonableness of reassignment, as opposed to requiring the
employer to show that such a transfer imposes an undue hardship, the Court
assured that employers seldom will be compelled to deviate from such a seniority
system.
An employee, nonetheless, may show that special circumstances warrant
a finding that reassignment is reasonable in a particular context. The Barnett
court recognized a limited set of circumstances in which an employee could
establish the reasonableness of reassignment under the particular facts."' The
Court described, as an example of such "special circumstances," the situation in
which the employer did not routinely adhere to the terms of an espoused seniority
policy, thereby reducing employee reliance expectations in such a policy.3 '
Seniority systems established by collective bargaining agreements
invariably will prevail over ADA reassignment requests. Although the seniority
system at issue in Barnett was not established through labor/management
negotiations, the Barnett decision clearly signals that collectively-bargained
seniority systems need not give way to the ADA's reassignment accommodation
duty. This conclusion follows for two reasons. First, the Barnett majority cited
with favor those circuit court decisions that have adopted a per se rule favoring
contractual seniority systems over reassignment for the disabled.3"2 Second, the
exception recognized by Justice Breyer's opinion is unlikely to come into play in
the collective bargaining setting. Because seniority rules established in a collective
bargaining agreement are enforceable through labor grievance and arbitration
procedures,03 a pattern of deviations from seniority-based contract rules will
seldom occur.
299. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 403.
300. See id. at 405-06.
301. Id. at 405.
302. Id. at 403-04.
303. See LAURA J. COOPER ET AL., ADR IN THE WORKPLACE 17 (2000) (reporting
that ninety-nine percent of collective bargaining agreements contain grievance procedures
culminating in binding arbitration for at least some grievances).
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2. Questions
a. What is the scope of the "special circumstances" exception recognized
in Barnett?
In carving out a "special circumstances" exception to the presumption
that it generally is not reasonable to require an employer to violate seniority rules
by reassigning a disabled employee, the Barnett majority provided two related
examples of when such circumstances might occur:
The plaintiff might show, for example, that the employer, having
retained the right to change the seniority system unilaterally,
exercises that right fairly frequently, reducing employee
expectations that the system will be followed-to the point where
one more departure ... will not likely make a difference .... The
plaintiff might show that the system already contains exceptions
such that, in the circumstances, one further exception is unlikely to
matter."'
The majority opinion then went on to state that "[w]e do not mean these examples
to exhaust the kinds of showings that a plaintiff might make."305 Since this
language leaves open the possibility that other types of "special circumstances"
also could justify reassignment in the face of a conflicting seniority system, the
scope of this exception remains unclear.
Justice Scalia is highly critical of the "special circumstances" exception.
His dissenting opinion chides the majority for creating "a state of uncertainty that
can be resolved only by constant litigation."30 6 Justice Scalia particularly criticizes
what he views as an exception that goes beyond the debunking of "sham" seniority
systems to also give disabled workers "a vague and unspecified power . . . to
undercut bonafide systems. "3"7
b. Does the ADA require an employer to transfer a qualified disabled
employee to a vacant position despite the superior qualifications of
another applicant or employee who also desires that position?
The only one of the five Barnett opinions to expressly mention the "better
qualified" debate," 8 is the dissenting opinion of Justice Scalia. In that opinion,
Justice Scalia listed the Humiston-Keeling decision,' °9 in which the Seventh Circuit
held that the ADA does not compel an employer to reassign a disabled employee
304. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 405.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 420 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
307. Id. at 419.
308. See supra notes 108-17 and acconpanying text (discussing the "better
qualified" debate).
309. 227 F.3d 1024, 1028-29 (7th Cir. 2000).
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over a better qualified applicant, among a number of circuit court decisions that he
sees as correctly ruling that the ADA does not mandate exceptions to legitimate
nondiscriminatory policies.31° More specifically, in his view, an employer's policy
of filling vacancies on the basis of qualifications is not a disability-related barrier
that necessitates an accommodation.3
A more recent Seventh Circuit decision, Mays v. Principi,3 2 reads the
Barnett majority opinion to support a somewhat similar result. In affirming the
district court's grant of summary judgment sustaining an employer's denial of a
reassignment request for various positions filled by better qualified applicants, the
appeals court stated:
This conclusion is bolstered by a recent decision of the Supreme
Court holding that an employer is not required to give a disabled
employee superseniority to enable him to retain his job when a more
senior employee invokes an entitlement to it conferred by the
employer's seniority system (citation omitted). If for "more senior"
we read "better qualified," for "seniority system" we read "the
employer's normal method of filling vacancies," and for
"superseniority" we read "a break," U.S. Airways becomes our
case.
3 13
The Seventh Circuit, by this passage, presumably believes that the Barnett
majority's analysis should be applied without adjustment in the "better qualified"
context. Under this approach, a requirement that an employer fill a vacancy with a
minimally qualified disabled employee, instead of a better qualified applicant or
employee, would be unreasonable in the run of cases, with the burden on the
employee to show special circumstances in order to overcome that burden.
It is quite plausible, however, to construe Barnett as authorizing a quite
different approach in this context. In Barnett, the Court placed the burden on the
employee to prove reasonableness because of the negative impact Barnett's
proposed reassignment would have on the seniority-driven expectations of his
fellow employees. 3 4 Arguably, an ADA preference for a minimally qualified
disabled worker in the "better qualified" context, would impact more significantly
on the employer's administrative operations than on co-employee expectations. As
discussed above,315 the ADA generally contemplates that the employer-based
impacts of an accommodation will be scrutinized as part of the undue hardship
analysis rather than at the reasonable accommodation stage. As such, this
alternative interpretation of Barnett could justify a reversal in the applicable
burden of proof such that reassignment in the "better qualified" context should be
310. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 416-17 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
311. Id. at 414-16.
312. 301 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2002).
313. Id. at 872.
314. See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 400-03.
315. See supra notes 248-50 and accompanying text.
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deemed reasonable unless the employer demonstrates that the transfer will impose
an undue hardship under the particular facts of the case.
c. Does the ADA's reassignment accommodation compel employers to
make exceptions to non-discriminatory transfer and assignment
policies?
Much the same can be said for this issue. The only mention of the broader
issue of employer transfer and assignment policies in general is in Justice Scalia's
dissenting opinion, which approvingly cites to a number of lower court decisions
holding "that the ADA does not mandate exceptions to a 'legitimate
nondiscriminatory policy.""'3 6 As one commentator has noted, a broad reading of
Barnett could lead to the result that "there is a presumption of reasonableness in
'neutral' policies that the plaintiff must overcome."3 '7 On the other hand, if the
principal impact of an exception to such a policy would fall upon the employer, an
undue hardship analysis perhaps is more appropriate.
Once again, the key question is whether the policies should be analyzed,
as in Barnett, through the lens of reasonable accommodation, or through the optic
reverse so as to require the employer to show that a reassignment exception to
such a policy would impose an undue hardship upon that employer. The answer to
this question likely will be outcome-determinative in most instances. 3 8
3. Suggested Solutions
a. The Scope of the Special Circumstances Exception
The scope of the "special circumstances" exception recognized by the
Barnett majority is uncertain because of two unknowns. The first unknown is
whether the examples provided by the Court are exhaustive of the types of
situations in which such circumstances may arise. While Justice Breyer states that
this is not necessarily so,3"' I believe that the opposite is more likely to be the case.
Both of the examples provided by the Court would justify an exception to
a seniority policy in circumstances where the "employees expectations that the
system will be followed" are not reasonably based. 2 This rationale is likely to
serve as the only appropriate basis for overcoming the presumption against
316. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 416 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
317. Cheryl L. Anderson, "'Neutral" Employer Policies and the ADA: The
Implications of US Airways v. Barnett Beyond Seniority Systems, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 35
(2002).
318. See supra notes 229-30 and accompanying text (discussing the importance
of which party bears the burden of persuasion).
319. See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 405 (stating that "[w]e do not mean these examples
to exhaust the kinds of showings that a plaintiff might make").
320. Id.
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reassignment in the seniority policy context because such a finding eliminates the
only articulated basis offered by the Barnett Court for finding that a reassignment
exception to a seniority policy is unreasonable in the run of cases. In its decision,
the Barnett majority explicitly justified its conclusion on the grounds that such
policies give rise to legitimate "employee expectation" that such policies will be
followed.32" ' As the policy behind the examples comprises a full mirror image of
the rationale for the anti-reassignment presumption, it is difficult to imagine how
any other set of circumstances could qualify for the exception.
The second unknown concerns how to identify the point at which
employee reliance expectations on a seniority policy are no longer reasonable. The
Barnett majority opinion provides little guidance here, simply stating that the anti-
reassignment presumption may be overcome in circumstances "where one more
departure [from the seniority policy] will not likely make a difference." '322 Justice
Scalia states that he has "no idea what this means," 3 and, in terms of setting a
predictable standard, it is difficult to disagree with that assessment.
A preferable approach is offered by Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion. Although she joined in the majority opinion, Justice O'Connor suggested
an alternative standard for determining the edge of reasonably preclusive seniority
rules, stating: "I would prefer to say that the effect of a seniority system on the
reasonableness of a reassignment as an accommodation for purposes of the ADA
depends on whether the seniority system is legally enforceable." '324 Under this
approach, an ADA-based exception is not reasonable if another employee has a
legally enforceable claim on that position flowing from the terms of the seniority
system. In contrast, if the seniority claim is so weak as not to be legally
enforceable, the reassignment request should be granted.
Justice O'Connor's proposed standard comes with the benefit of utilizing
recognizable legal standards for determining the scope of the special
circumstances exception. The enforceability of a seniority policy will depend upon
the application of well-established contract law concepts such as those involving
the principles of offer, waiver, reliance, and disclaimer. Justice O'Connor's
proposal also finds support in basic policy considerations. If an employer does not
have a legally enforceable claim to a vacant position, it is difficult to see how his
or her reasonable reliance expectations are disturbed by permitting a qualified
disabled employee to retain employment by transferring into that position.
321. Id. at 404-05.
322. Id. at 405.
323. Id. at 418 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
324. Id. at 408 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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b. Reassignment in the Face of Better-Qualified Applicants and Other
Employer Transfer and Assignment Policies
In an article predating the Barnett decision, a co-author and I offered
recommendations as to how the courts should balance the ADA's reassignment
accommodation with various nondiscriminatory employer transfer and assignment
policies.325 In doing so, we reached a somewhat different conclusion with respect
to the context in which a disabled employee is competing against a better-qualified
applicant than with respect to other types of policies.
The former context poses a difficult choice between filling a vacant
position with a qualified, disabled employee or with a better-qualified, non-
disabled applicant or fellow employee. After balancing the various considerations,
we concluded that the ADA's central purpose of helping disabled individuals to
participate fully in the American workplace supports generally preferring the
reassignment rights of the disabled employee.326 The employer, however, should
be able to overcome this presumption by establishing, as an affirmative defense,
that the failure to fill the vacancy would result in an undue hardship under the
particular circumstances.
327
In contrast, we generally endorsed the road map provided by the Tenth
Circuit's en banc decision in Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc.328 for resolving the
broader issue of when employers must set aside or make exception to non-
discriminatory employer policies in general.329 In Smith, the court stated that
employers should not be required to abandon neutral transfer and assignment
policies in order to reassign a disabled employee, unless the policy in question
would "essentially vitiate" the employer's express statutory obligation under the
ADA to reassign qualifying employees as a form of reasonable accommodation.330
We noted that this general rule would preserve an employer's ability to adopt
facially neutral policies in the management of the enterprise without eclipsing
employee expectations that have developed in reliance on such policies.33' On the
other hand, a no-transfer policy, 3 2 or a policy requiring all employees to compete
for vacant positions,333 would appear to "essentially vitiate" the ADA's
reassignment obligation. As such, we recommended that an employer should be
325. Befort & Donesky, supra note 265, at 1086-94.
326. Id. at 1087-90.
327. Id. at 1090.
328. 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
329. Befort & Donesky, supra note 265, at 1091-94.
330. See Smith, 180 F.3d at 1175-76.
331. See Befort & Donesky, supra note 265, at 1092.
332. See Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116 (1Oth Cir. 1999), discussed supra notes
118-19 and accompanying text.
333. See Ransom v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 983 F. Supp. 895 (D. Ariz. 1997),
discussed supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
2003] REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION 979
required to make an exception to such policies in order to reassign a qualified
individual with a disability."'
Prior to the Seventh Circuit's 2000 decision in EEOC v. Humiston-
Keeling, Inc.,335 the courts generally treated the "better-qualified" issue as distinct
from that of the employer policy issue.336 In Humiston-Keeling, however, Judge
Posner linked the two concepts by holding that an employer need not reassign a
disabled employee over a better-qualified competitor for the same position
"provided it's the employer's consistent and honest policy to hire the best
applicant for the particular job in question rather than the first qualified
applicant." '337 In linking these two contexts, the Seventh Circuit was able to draw
on existing precedent in the general policy arena to the effect that an employer
need not abandon a neutral transfer and assignment practice in order to award
preferential rights to a disabled employee.33 In effect, Humiston-Keeling treated
the better-qualified issue as a sub-species of the broader policies issue. A recent
law review article authored by Professor Cheryl Anderson also makes this same
connection, but argues that both issues should be resolved through a unified mode
of analysis that is more deferential to disabled workers.339 Upon reconsideration, I
now agree that the two questions are sufficiently similar so as to warrant a similar
analytical framework.
The key question is whether those policies should by tested via the
Barnett framework or by some other mode of analysis. I think that the latter option
is the more appropriate one.
The analytical focus in Barnett concentrated on the reasonable
accommodation stage of the ADA's anti-discrimination formula. The Barnett
majority focused on this stage because of the impact of U.S. Air's seniority system
on co-employee expectations.34 ° As the majority opinion explained, while the
employer impacts of a proposed accommodation generally are a matter for undue
hardship analysis, co-employee impacts are relevant at the earlier stage of
determining the accommodation's reasonableness. 4' Because a typical seniority
system creates "employee expectations of fair, uniform treatment," 342 an ADA-
compelled exception to such a system generally is not reasonable in the absence of
334. Befort & Donesky, supra note 265, at 1093.
335. 227 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 2000).
336. See generally Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999)
(en banc); Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
337. Humiston-Keeling, 227 F.3d at 1029.
338. See id. at 1028.
339. See Anderson, supra note 317, at 37-43.
340. See U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 400-01 (2002).
341. See id. at 400 (stating that while "[t]he statute refers to an 'undue hardship
on the operation of the business'. . . a demand for an effective accommodation could prove
unreasonable because of its impact, not on business operations, but on fellow employees").
342. Id. at 404.
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special circumstances 43 An employer, accordingly, is not required to demonstrate
that such an exception would impose an undue hardship on its operations or
resources unless the employee first overcomes the special circumstances hurdle.
Most types of employer transfer and assignment policies, however, are
enacted for the benefit of the employer rather than for the covered employees.
These policies typically provide employers with human resource tools that
enhance management objectives. And, in contrast to seniority systems, such
policies do not typically create objective expectations upon which employees
genuinely rely. As such, the principal impact of a mandated exception to such a
policy falls upon the employer rather than upon a disabled worker's fellow
employees.
These conclusions may be illustrated in an analogous setting. Collective
bargaining agreements typically contain provisions that call for the filling of
vacant positions based upon a mix of seniority and relative-ability
considerations. 44 Unions tend to desire strict seniority provisions because such
clauses tend to "militate against personal retaliation or preference." '345 Because
such clauses objectively entitle the most senior employee to a vacancy, labor
arbitrators generally place the burden of proof on the employer to show that the
most senior employee is not minimally qualified for the position.34 In contrast,
employers tend to desire relative-ability clauses because they enable an employer
to fill the position in question based upon a variety of factors largely within the
employer's discretion.347 Because these relative-ability clauses give deference to
the more subjective decision-making process of employers,348 labor arbitrators
generally put the burden of proof on the Union to show conclusively that the
employee selected by management is not the more qualified. 4 This, of course, is a
difficult task. Thus, the most senior employee frequently will have an enforceable
claim to a position under a strict seniority clause, but few individual employees
will be able to rely on a relative-ability clause as a basis to claim a legally
enforceable entitlement to a position that management has chosen to fill with
another employee.
343. Id. at 404-05.
344. See FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS
837 (Marlin M. Volz & Edward P. Goggin eds., 5th ed. 1997); CALVIN WILLIAM SHARPE,
THE COMMON LAW OF THE WORKPLACE § 5.9 (Theodore J. St. Antoine ed., 1998).
345. Overly Mfg. Co. of Cal., 68 LA 1343, 1345-46 (Jones 1977), quoted in
ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 344, at 808.
346. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 344, at 844; SHARPE, supra note 344,
§ 5.9.
347. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 344, at 845 (describing the numerous
criteria sometimes used in determining fitness and ability).
348. See Milbrook v. IBP, Inc., 280 F.3d 1169, 1176 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that
an employer's selection of candidates on the basis of qualifications often involves an
element of subjective decision-making).
349. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 344, at 841-43.
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In circumstances such as this, the appropriate analytical focus in assessing
most employer transfer and assignment policies should concentrate on the undue
hardship stage. As discussed above, the undue hardship stage is uniquely suited to
analyze the operational and resource burdens that a proposed accommodation will
impose on an employer under the particular facts, and, owing to the employer's
superior access to this information, the burden of proof with respect to these
impacts appropriately rests with the employer. 35 ° Thus, given the different focus of
the relative consequences of most transfer and assignment policies than that at
issue in the Barnett case, the ADA's reassignment accommodation in these other
contexts generally should be deemed reasonable, unless the reassignment either
undercuts objective employee expectations or would impose an undue hardship on
the employer.
Here again, Justice O'Connor's proposed test for determining
reasonableness provides valuable guidance. As noted above, Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion in Barnett maintains that the reasonableness of reassignment in
the Barnett context should depend upon whether an employer's seniority system is
legally enforceable. If a non-disabled employee has a legal entitlement to a vacant
position under such a system, Justice O'Connor's test would find that
reassignment in the face of such a claim generally is not reasonable."'
A similar mode of analysis should be used with respect to employer
transfer and assignment policies in general. If an employer's policy is stated and
administered in an objective manner so as to create a legally enforceable claim to a
vacant position, such as is true of many seniority systems, 352 a reassignment
exception to such a policy usually will be unreasonable. But most transfer and
assignment policies do not result in legally enforceable claims to a particular
employment position. This is so for two different reasons. First, some of these
policies, such as in the relative ability context35 3 or in a competitive consideration
context,3 54 vest subjective decision-making authority in the employer. Second,
other policies primarily serve to disqualify certain groups of employees from
claiming vacant positions, such as in the no-demotion, 355 no-transfer,356 and no
350. See supra notes 248-51 and accompanying text.
351. See U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 408 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
352. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 344, at 844.
353. See supra notes 108-17 and accompanying text (discussing employer
policies authorizing employer to prefer better-qualified applicants in terms of relative
ability).
354. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text (discussing employer
policies authorizing employer to fill vacancies on the basis of a competitive evaluation of
all candidates).
355. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text (discussing employer
policies that bar the filling of vacancies by means of demotion).
356. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text (discussing employer
policies that bar the filling of vacancies by means of employee transfers).
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transfer of part-time employee357 contexts. In either setting, these policies do not
confer a legally enforceable claim to a position on any particular employee. Under
Justice O'Connor's proposed test, accordingly, the reassignment of a qualified,
disabled employee as an exception to these types of policies is presumptively
reasonable, subject only to rebuttal through an employer's demonstration that the
reassignment would impose an undue hardship.
The undue hardship inquiry provides a suitable touchstone for this
analysis. The essence of the undue hardship inquiry concerns a determination as to
whether a proposed accommodation would impair employer operations by
imposing "significant difficulty or expense."35 Whether a particular reasonable
accommodation amounts to an undue hardship is considered in light of several
factors listed in the statute,359 including "the impact . . . of such accommodation
upon the operation of the facility."36 According to the EEOC's Interpretive
Guidance, an employer need not undertake "any accommodation that would be
unduly costly, extensive, substantial, or disruptive, or that would fundamentally
alter the nature or operation of the business."36 ' Therefore, in circumstances in
which an employer's ability to follow the terms of a transfer and assignment
policy is vital to the successful performance of the employer's business operations,
an employer may be able to demonstrate that a compelled exception to such a
policy in favor of a disabled employee would amount to an undue hardship.
The undue hardship defense represents Congress' attempt to balance the
legitimate business interests of employers with the legitimate needs of the
disabled. At bottom, the undue hardship inquiry is a more desirable means for
testing an employer's decision to deny the reassignment of a disabled employee
based upon the terms of a transfer and assignment policy, than the transplantation
of Barnett's presumption of unreasonableness into a context in which objective co-
employee expectations are not at stake.
This approach to employer transfer and assignment policies also properly
reflects the competing policy interests at stake. Consider, in this regard, the
respective fates of two employees-one disabled and one not-who each desire
the same vacant position. If the disabled employee is denied the requested transfer,
he or she is out of a job. Since reassignment is the accommodation of last resort,
the opportunity to be placed in this vacant position represents the disabled
employee's "last chance" to remain employed with that particular employer.362 In
contrast, the consequences suffered by the non-disabled employee who does not
357. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text (discussing employer
policies that bar the filling of vacancies by transferring part-time employees into full-time
positions).
358. 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(10)(A) (2003).
359. Id. § 1211 1(10)(B). See also supra note 27 (listing the factors considered
under § 12111(10)(B)).
360. 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(10)(B)(ii).
361. See Interpretive Guidance, supra note 29, § 1630.2(p).
362. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
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obtain the desired transfer are less severe. The non-disabled worker remains
employed in his or her current position, and the chance to move into a more
desirable position is deferred rather than lost. Given this significant disparity in
consequences, the scale generally should tip in favor of the disabled employee in
the absence of a showing of an undue hardship.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Barnett Court's holding is a relatively narrow one: an employer
generally need not reassign a disabled employee as a reasonable accommodation if
doing so would conflict with the terms of an employer's seniority policy, unless
special circumstances justify a different result. I find little to quarrel with in this
specific holding.363 The Barnett majority appropriately recognizes that employees
develop expectations in "fair, uniform treatment ' '3  in seniority policies that would
be undermined by an ADA-mandated exception. But, when such expectations are
not reasonably based due to special circumstances, the operation of the seniority
system should not trump the ADA's goal of enhancing the employment of
disabled workers through reassignment.
The fundamental shortcoming of the Barnett decision, however, is in the
Court's failure to provide adequate guidance for future controversies. The Court is
imprecise with respect to the type of "special circumstances" that will overcome
the presumption of unreasonableness in requiring a reassignment in the face of a
conflicting seniority system. The Court does not explain how its ruling will impact
the balance of reassignment and other types of transfer and assignment policies.
The Court fails to articulate a clear allocation of the burden of proof
responsibilities with respect to establishing a reasonable accommodation. And,
finally, the Court falls short of demarcating when, if ever, an accommodation
should be deemed unreasonable by virtue of the fact that it requires the provision
of preferential treatment for the disabled.
In its defense, the Court quite likely did not answer these questions
because it could not reach a consensus on these issues. The five separate opinions
authored by the justices in Barnett reveal a Court that is quite sharply divided with
respect to the proper construction of the ADA's text and its purposes. Nonetheless,
these divergent views offer clues that may portend future developments.
These clues, along with an analysis of the statute's policy objectives,
provide a basis for suggesting possible solutions for Barnett's unanswered
questions. With respect to the general reasonable assignment obligation, the Court
should adopt an allocation that splits the burden of proving reasonableness
between the employee and the employer. This approach, endorsed by the Second
363. See Befort & Donesky, supra note 265, at 1091-92 (suggesting that neutral
transfer and assignment policies that engender reasonable expectations among employees,
such as a seniority system, should be upheld under the ADA in most instances).
364. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 404 (2002).
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Circuit in Borkowski,36 adequately balances the respective interests and
information access of the two parties. Under this model, the financial and
operational impact of an accommodation on the employer is primarily a matter for
the employer to establish as part of the undue hardship analysis. The Court also
should dispense with the misguided search for boundaries that would prohibit or
unduly limit accommodations on the grounds that they confer preferential
treatment on the disabled. The ADA adopts a different treatment model of
discrimination that utilizes some types of preferential treatment in order to achieve
a level playing field for the disabled. 66 The appropriate limit on these preferential
accommodations is the undue hardship defense, not the misplaced rhetoric of the
affirmative action debate.
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Barnett provides an appropriate
touchstone for the unanswered questions relating to the reassignment
accommodation. According to Justice O'Connor, reassignment is unreasonable if
someone other than the disabled employee seeking a transfer has a legally
enforceable entitlement to the position in question. 67 This standard provides a
predictable basis for determining Barnett's special circumstances exception to the
presumption favoring seniority systems. More broadly, this standard calls for an
undue hardship-based test for determining whether reassignment should prevail
over other types of transfer and assignment policies.
Perhaps the most surprising, and most significant, aspect of the Barnett
majority opinion was the Court's decision to analyze the propriety of Barnett's
reassignment request as an issue of reasonable accommodation as opposed to that
of an issue of undue hardship. This determination was premised upon the fact that
an exception to the operation of a seniority system would trammel upon the
legitimate expectations that employees have developed in reliance on the uniform
operation of the seniority system. This characteristic, however, is absent with
respect to most other types of employer transfer and assignment policies. These
policies typically reserve an employer's discretion in filling vacancies or provide a
basis for disqualifying certain groups of employees in filling vacancies. In contrast
to seniority policies, these other policies do not typically create legally enforceable
claims to vacant positions. As such, exceptions to these policies should be tested,
not as a matter of reasonable accommodation, but as a matter of undue hardship.
While the Supreme Court may have passed on a golden opportunity in
Barnett to resolve some of these significant issues, another opportunity
undoubtedly will arise in the near future. The justices, at that time, hopefully will
overcome their current divergent views of the ADA and adopt a policy-based
approach to the treatment of reasonable accommodation and reassignment similar
365. The Borkowski decision is discussed supra at notes 225-27 and
accompanying text.
366. See supra notes 284-86 and accompanying text.
367. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 409 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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to that proposed in this Article. Such an approach would go a long way toward
achieving Congress' core objective of enhancing the employability of the disabled.
* * *
